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ABSTRACT 
Corporate reporting is increasingly seen to be thc result of an active managerial decision, the 
disclosure policy. as opposed to being traditionally considered a determinant of predominantly 
external factors. Naturally, the process giving rise to the disclosure policy should involve a cost-
benefit analysis. \Vhile the costs of reporting are normally tangible, international research has found 
the benefits thereof not to be easily observed. This study focuses on the beneficial capital market 
effects of corporate disclosure policy of large South African firms listed on the JSE Securities 
Exchange (JSE). 
Among the potential benefits is a reduction of information asymmetry. This relates to the 
misalignment of the amount of information held by different stakeholders, such as management and 
investors and is associated with adverse consequences such as lower equity valuations. Another 
related effect of disclosure policy is a positive change in the behaviour of earnings forecast analysts, 
such as more analysts following companies' performance. 
In the near absence of local research, this study sets two primary objectives. The first objective is to 
investigate the disclosure policy effect on information asymmetry specifically the bid-ask spread and 
trading volume. The second objective is to research the disclosure policy effect on analyst behaviour, 
namely the analyst following, forecast dispersion, forecast accuracy and revision volatility. 
The 100 largest companies, as measured by market capitalisation. make up the sample within this 
study. This sample was adopted from the Ernst & Young (E& Y) survey of Excellence in Corporate 
Reporting. The six cross-sectional regression models employed a total of eight independent variables. 
The analyses were repeated for each of the four survey years from 2001 to 2004. 
The results suggest a statistically significant disclosure policy effect on information asymmetry as 
indicated by a negative relationship between disclosure policy and the bid-ask spread. The finding of a 
statistically significant positive relationship between disclosure and the number of analysts following a 
company indicates the existence of a limited disclosure policy effect on analyst behaviour in South 
Africa. In addition, it was found that a wider proxy for disclosure policy may be necessary, as 
suggested by prior research, to determine a broader disclosure policy effect on analyst behaviour. 
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CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Research into corporate disclosure has undergone a fundamental change within the last decade. 
Traditionally, research literature focused on company or capital market attributes (e.g. company size, 
industry type, stock market listing etc.) that may explain varying levels of corporate disclosure. The 
pioneer of this type of research was Cerf (1961), the first researcher to fonnally assess companies' 
annual reports. 
The recognition that corporate reporting is not necessarily an exogenous detenninant of various 
environmental factors but often appears to be used by companies as an instrument as part of their 
corporate strategy has begun to change contemporary disclosure research. Consequently, instead of 
researching the effect of various detenninants on disclosure, today's research is investigating the 
effects that disclosure has on the environment, which is mainly the capital market. This notion was 
captured by Welker (1998: 539) who noted that "there is [a] growing recognition that disclosure can 
be viewed as an economic decision, carrying, perhaps, unique costs and benefits." 
In South Africa, research on the disclosure effect on the capital market is limited. As a result, this 
study follows Welker's (1998) notion and investigates two broad capital market benefits of corporate 
disclosure. The first relates to infonnation asymmetry, which exists whenever market participants are 
privy to different levels of infonnation (Botosan, 2000). Such asymmetry is observable both between 
managers and investors and amongst investors. It has adverse capital market effects on companies 
such as lowering market liquidity and increasing their cost of capital. Reducing infonnation 
asymmetry, through improved disclosure!, may thus offset the above adverse effects and give rise to 
higher company valuations. The second capital market benefit relates to earnings-forecasting analysts 
who perfonn important functions as economic agents such as communicating value-relevant 
infonnation and monitoring corporate management (Rock, Sedo & Willenborg, 2001). In perfonning 
1 "Improved disclosure" can be interpreted as both an increase in the quantity as well as an increase of the quality of 
disclosure (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). The use of the expression of "improved reporting" or "increased disclosure" is 
therefore for editorial convenience rather than to indicate the former or the latter. 
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such functions, analysts depend on corporate reporting and are exposed to information asymmetry 
similarly to ordinary investors2. Improving analysts' ability to perform their function is thus expected 
to benefit the market's understanding of companies' returns and their appeal as investment. 
The link between the two areas of research is that both are measures of the information content 
available in the capital market. Whilst analysts are generally more advanced and resourceful in the 
process of information generation and gathering than the average investor, both parties rely on 
corporate reporting as a pivotal source of information. This view was supported by several researchers 
such as Lang and Lundholm (1993) who went as far as employing analyst behaviour as a proxy for 
information asymmetry. It follows that, although being researched as two separate topics within this 
report, there is a close theoretical connection between information asymmetry and analyst behaviour. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The limited amount of South African empirical evidence as to a potential beneficial relationship 
between corporate disclosure and the level of information asymmetry and analyst behaviour represents 
the motivation for this study. Currently, it is unclear whether South African companies use their 
disclosure as an instrument to influence the capital market or not. To investigate the beneficial 
relationships between disclosure policy and the South African capital market is, therefore, an 
appealing research area. 
Consequently, the objectives of this study are: 
(a) to determine if disclosure policy bears an inverse relationship with the level of information 
asymmetry found in the South African capital market by 
• reducing the bid-ask spread of the sample companies' shares, 
• increasing the trading volume of the sample companies' shares and 
(b) to investigate the existence of a positive relationship between companies' disclosure policy and 
analyst behaviour by 
• increasing the number of analysts, 
• reducing the forecast dispersion, 
• increasing the forecast accuracy and 
• reducing the volatility of forecast revisions. 
2 They may be affected to a lesser extent due to significant resources available to process and assess information. 
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1.3 Report Structure 
The remainder of this study unfolds as follows: 
Chapter 2 introduces the accounting disclosure environment, explains the terminology "disclosure 
policy" and provides an account of the costs and benefits associated with disclosure. Thereafter, a 
framework of disclosure research to date separates prior research into two classes and describes their 
different contributions. This is complemented by a discussion of the control variables employed within 
this study. 
Chapter 3 details the data collection procedures and the calculation of the variables involved. It then 
introduces the statistical methodology used and discusses limitations to the scope of this study. 
Chapter 4 presents and discusses the results of the statistical analyses performed. The results are 
integrated with international research findings and the South African commercial context. As all tests 
are performed individually for each of four consecutive years a trend analysis will be included. 
Finally, in Chapter 5 conclusions are drawn and areas for future research work are suggested. 
3 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERA TURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of international literature findings that allow for an understanding of 
how this study's research objectives have been derived. This requires a few preparatory sections. 
These begin with a discussion of the annual report within the wider horizon of corporate disclosure, 
which explains why it is considered to be a proxy for overall corporate disclosure. The second section 
describes the environment in which companies disclose, followed by a description of the term 
"disclosure policy". Thereafter, a framework of disclosure research is developed to outline the change 
that contemporary disclosure literature has undergone. This develops two groups of research literature, 
their different contributions and finally places this study within this framework. 
The body of this chapter discusses the main costs and benefits attributable to corporate disclosure. 
This focuses only on those research findings that are directly related to the topics of information 
asymmetry and analyst behaviour or have an explicit link thereto. For example, the cost of equity 
capital is explained in detail because the level of information asymmetry is one of its main 
components. This knowledge is of particular relevance in the analysis of the empirical research 
findings of this study as they indicate that a disclosure policy effect may not be limited to the two 
research areas presented here. 
Lastly, this chapter ends with a detailed exploration of each of the variables employed within this 
study. 
4 
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2.2 Preparatory Sections 
2.2.1 Annual Reports as Indicator of Overall Disclosure 
This study employs the annual report as a proxy for companies' overall disclosure effort. This section 
explains the literature findings that form the basis of this approach. 
Corporate disclosure can be categorised into three different classes: published information3, investor 
relations4 and annual reports. These are the categories ranked by the United States (U.S.) Association 
of Investment and Management Research (AIMR), one of whose objectives is to improve corporate 
communication5. The AIMR rankings have been used as a disclosure proxy in various prior research 
projects (Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Lang & Lundholm, 1993,1996; Welker, 1995; Sengupta, 1998). 
Whilst some international research examined all three categories6, this study only considers the annual 
report7• Questions as to the annual report's relevance in the general disclosure environment were 
addressed by various recent studies. While Francis and Shipper (1999) produced little evidence as to 
financial statements' loss of relevance, Lev and Zarowin (1999) concluded that the usefulness of 
annual reports had declined over the past twenty. 
Ignoring this issue, Michailesco (2001) concluded that annual reports are the major information source 
for investors who are unable to incur large expenditure in accessing investment relevant information. 
Similarly, Knutson (1992: 122) stated: "At the top of every analyst'S list is the annual report to 
shareholders. It is the major reporting document and every other financial report is in some respect 
subsidiary or supplementary to it." 
Furthermore, Hope (2003) concluded that annual reports are a vital source of information to analysts, 
especially where the number of analysts following a company is low. This stresses the importance of 
the annual report in South Africa where the average number of analysts following a company is lower 
than in the U.S.8 
3 This consists of press releases and interim statements, excluding the annual report. 
4 This includes direct analyst communication. 
S See Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) for a detailed description of AIMR analyst ranking guidelines. 
6 (Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Healy et aI., ] 999; Lang & Lundholm, 1996, 2000; Welker, 1995) 
7 This approach was also followed by: Botosan (1997, 2000); Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
8 The average number of analysts per company in this study is six compared to 12 in a U.S. study by Botosan (1997). The 
average analyst following in South Africa was extrapolated from the test data researched here. 
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Botosan (1997) noted that the annual report serves as a good proxy for the level of disclosure provided 
across all disclosure avenues. In support of this argument, Lang and Lundholm (1993) found that 
annual report disclosure is positively correlated with the other forms of disclosure. In short, the 
majority of contemporary research regards the annual report as an important indicator of companies' 
overall disclosure effort. As a result, this study employs annual reports as a proxy for companies' 
disclosure. 
The following section introduces the environmental influences on companies' disclosure in South 
Africa. 
2.2.2 The South African Disclosure Environment 
This section presents a brief account of the regulatory environment in which South African companies 
report. In addition, it highlights several non-mandatory reporting guidelines. 
In South Africa, corporate reporting is regulated by the Companies Act (1973), South African 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP) as developed by the South African Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (SAICA) but issued by the Accounting Practice Board (APB) and listing 
requirements issued by the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). In addition, there are several 
non-mandatory reporting frameworks such as the King II Report (2002), SAICA's Stakeholder 
Communication document (1997) and the Global Reporting Initiative. These will be discussed in the 
same order below. 
In terms of Schedule 4 of the Companies Act, companies are required to disclose departures from 
GAAP and the reasons and effects thereof. In a legal opinion, issued by SAICA, this was understood 
as to indicate that non-disclosure of the particulars of any departure by directors does imply GAAP 
compliance. Recently proposed Companies Act amendments aim to make GAAP compliance a legal 
requirement. 
To improve the quality of local reporting and make South African annual reports internationally 
comparable, South African statements of GAAP have been replaced by statements that are identical to 
International Accounting Standards (lAS). This convergence process was substantially completed 
during the late 1990's. From 1 January 2005, South Africa adopted lAS and is now fully compliant 
with all standards issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Currently, change 
6 
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in accounting standards is driven by two processes. Firstly, the IASB's Improvements Project aims to 
reduce or eliminate alternatives and conflicts within the standards and deal with some convergence 
issues. This process yielded revised lAS's. Secondly, the Harmonisation project of U.S. GAAP and 
lAS aims to resolve differences in treatments, which impair the comparability of financial statements. 
The standards that are drafted within this process and all other new standards issued by the IASB are 
named International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
In terms of JSE listing requirements, all listed companies must comply, in full, with all statements of 
GAAP. Any non-compliance together with the financial effects thereof must be disclosed. 
In November 1994, the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa published the first King Report on 
Corporate Governance. The Second King Report on Corporate Governance, King II, was published in 
March 2002 and offers more extensive guidelines on corporate governance. These cover board 
structures, recommendations on directors' functions, risk management, environmental disclosure and 
the reporting of social involvements. Compliance with King II is voluntary but listed companies are 
encouraged to implement the recommendations. The extent and the period of any deviations from the 
guidelines in King II are to be disclosed in terms ofthe JSE listing requirements. 
In addition, SAICA have issued a document named "Stakeholder Communication" which offers 
guidelines on the structure and content of annual reports in order to improve stakeholder 
communication. This document aims to improve companies' recognition of the need to report to non-
traditional stakeholders such as employees, customers and suppliers. 
Another set of non-legislative, and thus voluntary, reporting guidelines is issued by the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI). The GRI's aim is to foster globally applicable sustainability reporting on 
economic, environmental and social issues of companies' activities. 
This section provided a brief overview of the environmental factors that were previously considered 
dominant in determining company disclosure. The next section draws up a framework which shows 
how contemporary research has changed in favour of research addressing the impact of corporate 
disclosure rather than its determinants. In addition, it groups research studies and gives a graphical 
overview thereof. 
7 
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2.2.3 A Framework of Literature to Date 
Wiedman (2000) defined three broad areas of disclosure literature: the disclosure environment, the 
disclosure attributes and the disclosure impact. The first category, the disclosure environment, 
describes the characteristics of the environment in which the disclosure decision is made (see 2.2.2). 
The second category, the disclosure attributes, includes the nature of disclosures made, such as the 
type, frequency, timeliness, quality and credibility of reporting. Finally, the third category, the 
disclosure impact, addresses the disclosure effect on factors such as the cost of capital, liquidity, 
agency costs and shareholder mix. 
Typically, research work investigates the associations between two of the three areas i.e. the 
relationship between disclosure attributes and the disclosure environment or disclosure attributes and 
the related impact. For the purpose of this study, the former branch will be categorised as Type I and 
the latter as Type II. 
Type I work, which is the original and the older form of disclosure research, has contributed important 
knowledge. This includes that of the relationship between company size and the level of disclosure 
(Buzby, 1975; Firth, 1979, Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Raffoumier, 1995). Another type is the 
association between disclosure and levels of information asymmetry (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; 
Marquardt & Wiedman, 1998). This research knowledge is essential as it allows contemporary studies 
to investigate relationships that go beyond the traditional question of what determines the level of 
disclosure. Type I research findings are mentioned in more detail in section 2.5, which discusses the 
choice of control variables. 
As a result of Type I research findings, disclosure is now most often used as an explanatory variable 
rather than a dependent variable as in Type I studies. Figure 1 (next page) presents a graphical 
overview of Type I and Type II research. This classification may also serve as a starting point for 
future research in this field. 
8 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
FIGURE 1. THREE COMPONENTS OF DISCLOSURE LITERATURE 
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Botosan & Plumlee, 2002 
Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991 
Durn & Reeb, 2002 
Hail,2001 
Healy et aI., 1999 
Healy & Palepu, 200 I 
Hope, 2003 
Joos, 2000 
Kim, Lim & Shaw, 2001 
Lang & Lundholm, 1996, 2000 
Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000 
Lundholm & Myers, 2002 
Marquardt & Wiedman, 1998* 
Negash,2001 
Rock et al., 2001 
Welker, 1995 
Zhang, 2001 
Type I: Research on the relationship between the disclosure environment and disclosure attributes. 
Type II: Research on the relationship between the disclosure attributes and disclosure impact. 
* This study fits the criteria of both categories. 
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An inspection of Figure 1 confirms that Type I research appears to have commenced significantly 
earlier than Type II research. 
In summary, Type I research provided much of the basic knowledge pertaining to companies' 
propensity to disclose. In doing so, it established relationships that are now accepted amongst 
contemporary researchers and contributed many of the control variables that are used in today's Type 
II studies on the disclosure effects. In its attempt to document a beneficial relationship between 
disclosure and the South African capital market this investigation should be classified as Type II 
research. 
The following section illustrates how the recognition of disclosure as being the outcome of an 
economic decision leads to the use ofthe term "disclosure policy". 
2.2.4 The Terminology: Disclosure Policy 
Despite mandatory requirements, such as those found in annual reports, companies have considerable 
latitude in determining the informativeness of their disclosure and the level of detail provided (Lang & 
Lundholm, 1996). Welker (1995) expanded this by mentioning companies' discretion as to the 
timeliness, scope, content and form of disclosure. In the South African context, the variation in 
measured reporting levels from excellent to perfunctory9 within the Ernst & Young (E&Y) survey of 
Excellence in Corporate Reporting appears to confirm this. The discretion as to the level of detail and 
informativeness is even more pronounced for published information and direct analyst communication 
(Botosan 1997), for which annual reports are a proxy within this study. 
Over time, Lang and Lundholm (1993:253) found that disclosure levels are "sticky", suggesting that 
managers commit to certain levels of disclosure and seldom vary this level over time. In support of 
this, Botosan and Harris (2000) found no evidence of U.S. firms ceasing quarterly disclosure of 
segmented information once initiated. They concluded that the decision to initiate quarterly segmented 
reporting effectively commits to a disclosure policy. It thus appears that, despite mandatory reporting 
requirements, corporations have a considerable degree of freedom in determining their level of 
disclosure. This suggests that the observed level of corporate disclosure is the result of a conscious 
disclosure policy taken by management. Accordingly, this study uses the term "disclosure policy" to 
9 In the 2004 survey, 29% of all companies' annual reports were rated excellent, 33% good, 26% adequate and 12% 
perfunctory. 
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refer to the overall informativeness of a firm's disclosure as measured by the adjudicators of the E& Y 
survey of Excellence in Corporate Reporting. 
The decision or policy to disclose at a certain level involves a certain commitment to report. The next 
section presents research findings supporting this notion. 
2.2.4.1 Disclosure Policy - a Commitment to report 
Botosan (1997) documented that disclosure scores are not independent from year to year, which lead 
her to conclude that disclosure policies are constant over time. Based on the finding of "sticky" 
disclosure levels, Lang and Lundholm (1993) referred to a commitment to increased levels of 
voluntary disclosure. Subsequent researchers distinguished between a commitment and voluntary 
disclosure by noting that the former is a decision taken before the content of the information is known, 
whereas the latter is a decision taken after the content is identified (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). Hence, 
disclosure policy appears to involve a commitment to report information regardless of content. 
For disclosure policies to be effective in influencing the level of information asymmetry and analyst 
behaviour, the capital market has to perceive the actual disclosure as credible. The following section 
introduces this concept. 
2.2.4.2 Disclosure Policy - Credibility 
As managers have incentives to make self-serving disclosures (2.4.2 below), it is unclear whether 
disclosure in general is credible. 
Lang and Lundholm (2000) documented that companies are generally rewarded for higher disclosure 
frequencies but penalised by the market if disclosure is increased with the sole intention to issue 
equity capital. This suggests that investors differentiate in their assessment of reporting credibility. 
Similarly, Healy et al. (1999) pointed out that companies' disclosure of bad news in order to correct 
overvaluation and potential resultant litigation (Skinner, 1997) is inherently credible while news to 
correct undervaluation is not. Frost (1997) added that credibility of disclosure declines for firms in 
financial distress. Botosan (2000) concluded that disclosure's perceived credibility and the subsequent 
disclosure policy should be based on a cost-benefit analysis. The costs associated with disclosure 
policy are introduced in the following section. 
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2.3 Costs of Corporate Disclosure 
This section presents four significant costs associated with corporate disclosure. Although these 
represent the predominant research findings, this account is not comprehensive as this study focuses 
on beneficial capital market effects. 
The obvious costs of corporate disclosure appear to be costs incurred in collecting, processing and 
publishing corporate information. Literature to date has documented a strong link between company 
size and the costs of corporate disclosure. This type of cost has a fixed component, so that the cost per 
unit of size decreases (Buzby, 1975; Lang & Lundholm, 1993). In addition, the notion of decreasing 
preparation costs with company size is embedded in the FASB's and the SEC's mandate of disclosure 
• 10 
reqlllrements . 
Another cost is the loss of competitive advantage through the communication of proprietary 
information. Again, this cost appears to be negatively correlated to company size (Singhvi & Desai, 
1971). Healy and Palepu (2001) observed that firms have an incentive not to disclose information that 
will reduce their competitive position even at the expense of higher marginal capital costs. However, 
they also cautioned that the sensitivity of the association between disclosure and competitive market 
forces depends on the nature of the competition, particularly, whether companies compete based on 
price or long-run capacity and on whether firms face actual competition or merely the threat of entry. 
A third type of cost of corporate reporting identified in literature to date is related to potential 
litigation. The direction, however, is unclear. Some researchers such as Botosan (2000) held that 
litigation costs arise when companies are sued based on information disclosed whereas others (Healy 
& Palepu, 2001) acknowledged that legal action can both encourage disclosure as well as potentially 
reduce managers' incentives to disclose. Empirical evidence is mixed. Skinner (1997) found that firms 
with bad earnings news are more than twice as likely to pre-disclose poor earnings performance than 
are well-performing firms. In addition, he noted tentative evidence that legal costs are lower for firms 
that pre-disclose than for firms that do not. On the contrary, Francis, Philbrick and Shipper (1994) 
found that 62% of their litigation sample was sued as result of pre-emptive earnings announcements. 
Lastly, political costs have been identified in connection with disclosure. Cooke (1989) mentioned that 
larger entities take a more prominent position and are therefore more likely to be subject to voters 
lobbying government for nationalisation, expropriation or break-up of the company. To frustrate such 
10 For example, small fInns were exempted from SFAS No. 89: Financial Reporting and Changing Prices. 
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actions, corporations are supposedly more likely to increase their disclosure. Although nationalisation 
or expropriation appear unlikely in the South African context, large corporations are more likely to be 
the focus of black economic empowerment campaigns and employment equity quotas. To appease 
government and generate public goodwill, large companies can be expected to increase disclosure of 
their social involvement and the performance of their employment equity strategies and programs. 
Hamann (2003) confirmed this in the South African environment by stating: "public reporting, in 
particular, is emerging as a key tool for companies to demonstrate their sustainability efforts and to 
respond to public and shareholder demands for transparency." He added that while South African 
companies trail international trends in the practice of sustainability reporting, they have led the way in 
terms of social reporting owing to their experience with supporting local development and providing 
for black economic empowerment in the national and local context. 
Although the nature of the relationships between the above four costs and corporate reporting is not 
fully understood and contradictory at times, they do appear to impact on disclosure policies. The 
above issues form the thrust of the cost component of the cost-benefit analysis that should precede the 
disclosure policy decision. To allow for an understanding of this analysis, the following section 
continues with a discussion ofthe relevant benefits of corporate disclosure. 
2.4 Benefits of Corporate Disclosure 
This section explores the benefits attributable to corporate disclosure policy. Literature to date showed 
that, in theory, the different benefits are often closely linked or even components of each other 
(Botosan, 1997,2000; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Lang & Lundholm, 1996). The most prominent example 
of this effect is seen in the cost of capital. A key component determining companies' cost of capital is 
the level of information asymmetry that affects the financiers and investors of a company. A study of 
the information asymmetry would thus be incomplete without a discussion of its possible effects. As a 
result, in spite of not directly researching the topic of capital costs, this study presents research relating 
to the topic. This facilitates the later analysis and interpretation of the empirical research findings of 
this study. Before describing the benefits of corporate reporting, this section introduces the challenges 
facing researchers of this area and the effect these have on research methodologies and findings. 
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Although the benefits from financial infonnation are usually difficult or impossible to measure 
objectively (F AS B) 11, considerable research efforts have been made to detennine possible beneficial 
relationships between corporate disclosure and capital markets. Empirical results have yielded mixed 
evidence and in many cases researchers had to approximate economic indicators such as the cost of 
equity capital (Botosan 1997, Hail 2001), which are not easily observed. In other cases, researchers 
were forced to exploit certain economic anomalies to test their hypotheses. For example, Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000) used finns that switched from the Gennan to an international reporting framework 
to model sustained improvements of disclosure policy. 
This highlights the difficulties experienced by empirical researchers of the disclosure policy effects. 
Inter alia, these can be attributed to the fact that the majority of disclosure research is undertaken 
using U.S. data, an environment that is infonnation rich (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). Core (2001) 
considered it difficult to find strong disclosure-related effects in broad cross-sections of U.S. finns 
while Healy and Palepu (200 1) suggested that there might be too much disclosure regulation and that 
market participants would be willing to accept less infonnation in exchange for finns having to spend 
fewer resources on infonnation production. 
Part of the observed infonnation richness can be attributed to infonnation intennediaries such as 
analysts. Botosan (1997) could only document a disclosure policy effect on the cost of equity capital 
for companies with low analyst coverage. This implies that where a company interacts with a high 
number of analysts, the infonnation available is so rich that measuring a disclosure policy effect on the 
equity capital cost becomes difficult. Lang and Lundholm (2000: 627) confinned this and stated that 
"we limit our sample to small finns, given their limited analyst following, they are more likely to use 
their disclosure policy to influence market perceptions." 
Hail (2001) provided more indirect evidence as to the difficulties experienced in measuring a 
disclosure policy effect. In order to test for the hypothesised effect on the cost of capital, she chose the 
Swiss capital market. This market was selected for the high degree of freedom in setting disclosure 
policy given the low levels of mandatory accounting standards and also for its small, illiquid and 
highly concentrated stock market. This suggests that her intention was to test her hypothesis in an 
environment that has a lower overall infonnation content. 
II SFAS No 1. 
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Notwithstanding the unfavourable research conditions examined above, research consensus is in 
favour of beneficial disclosure policy effects on capital markets. The remainder of this chapter 
introduces the theoretical framework and the empirical results of studies that researched these 
beneficial disclosure policy effects. 
2.4.1 The Cost of Capital 
In theory, providing more information to the market can lower capital costs. More information 
facilitates more accurate forecasting of future cash flows and reduces the uncertainty component of the 
discount rate applied to future earnings. It also decreases the risk premium charged on borrowed 
funds. 
As providing more information is associated with costs (see 2.3 above), the disclosure decision should 
be based on a positive cost-benefit analysis (Botosan, 2000). However, the practical application of this 
is complicated and hence it appears rational that corporate management might tend to place undue 
emphasis on the costs of disclosure versus the benefits thereof. The rest of this section discusses the 
disclosure policy effect on the cost of equity and the cost of debt. 
2.4.1.1 Cost of Equity 
"The ultimate benefit of providing more information to the market is a lower cost of equity capital and 
thus a higher share price" (Botosan, 2000: 60). Botosan (1997), the research pioneer of the disclosure 
policy effect on the equity cost of capital, built a two-tiered framework showing the components of the 
cost of equity capital and the disclosure policy effects thereon. 
The first tier describes how greater disclosure enhances stock market liquidity, which will 
subsequently lower the cost of equity capital. This is achieved through either a reduction in transaction 
costs or an increase in the demand for the company's securities. Inter alia, Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1991) supported this claim by noting that disclosure improves the future share liquidity by reducing 
the adverse price impact of trades I 2. As a result, investors are willing to take larger stakes in a 
company than they would otherwise do, thereby increasing liquidity and reducing the cost of equity 
capital. 
12 Where information is low, a trade is expected to reveal private information. The existence of private information may act 
as a deterrent to trade to those without access to such information. Increasing the level of information available would thus 
reduce the information revealed by trades. 
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The second tier explains how greater disclosure reduces estimation risk ansmg from investors' 
uncertainty in making estimates of a eompany's return and its ability to generate returns in excess of 
its cost of capital. Amongst others, these are based on corporate history and disclosed infonnation. 
Understandably, greater uncertainty regarding the true parameters exists where the available 
infonnation content is low. If this estimation risk is non-diversifiable (Clarkson, Guedes & Thompson, 
1996), investors require compensation for the additional risk to which they are exposed. Hence, 
assuming more available infonnation would reduee the uncertainty experienced by investors in 
assessing future returns, a negative relationship between disclosure policy and estimation risk should 
exist. This would involve diminishing the discount required by investors and so facilitate higher 
valuations of a finn's share, which subsequently lowers the cost of equity capital. Lang and Lundholm 
(1993) confinned this framework by mentioning the overeoming of adverse selection and the 
reduction of transaction costs, as described above, as theoretical motivators for disclosure. 
In her later work, Botosan (2000) refined this framework to emphasise the effect of infonnation 
asymmetry. Figure 2 presents a diagram of Botosan's (2000) two-tiered framework and shows how 
disclosure is linked to the cost of equity capital. 
FIGURE 2. THE DISCLOSURE IMPACT ON THE COST OF EQUITY 
CAPITAL 
I Enhanced Public Disclosure I 
I I 
Reduced Infonnation Asymmetry Redueed Infonnation Asymmetry 
between Managers and Investors between Investors 
I 
Reduced Estimation Risk Increased Market Liquidity for Shares 
I 
I Reduced Cost of Equity Capital I 
The remainder of this section discusses empirical research methodologies and findings. 
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Botosan (1997) used a derivation of the dividend discount modeL After documenting insignificant 
results for her entire sample, she divided her sample into one subset with a low analyst following 
(mean of 5) and one subset with a high analyst following (mean of 18). Upon this modification, she 
established a significant 9% cost of equity capital advantage for the most forthcoming company to 
disclose in the low analyst following group relative to less forthcoming companies. In a more recent 
study of the relationship between annual reports and analyst forecast accuracy across 22 countries, 
Hope (2003)13 confirmed this result and remarked that annual report disclosure is more important for 
firms that are followed by fewer analysts. Hail (2001) applied a version of the accounting based 
valuation formula referred to as the residual income model and found a significant 1.9% cost of equity 
capital advantage for the most forthcoming firms to disclose relative to the least forthcoming firms. 
This suggests an information rich environment for companies that are followed by significant numbers 
of analysts. Hence, a study examining all three categories of disclosurel 4 should find a significant 
association between investor relations activities and the cost of equity capital. Contrary to this 
expectation, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) did not establish a significant link between investor relations 
activities and the cost of equity capital. 
Zhang (2001) added to the complexity of cost of capital literature by building a model that predicts 
that the capital cost can react positively and negatively to firms' disclosure policies, depending on the 
specific factors responsible for the variation in the sample. He also pointed out that prior models 
treated disclosure as an exogenous parameter whilst his model treated company disclosure as 
endogenous choice. 
In summary, Botosan (1997) was the pioneer of empirical research on the disclosure policy effect on 
the cost of capital. She documented a cost of equity capital advantage for firms with low analyst 
following. Another researcher, Hail (2001), documented more significant effects only by investigating 
an environment with a weaker reporting framework. Overall, both the difficulty in observing the cost 
of equity capital and the information richness of the U.S. capital market explain the small amount of 
direct research in this field. However, the broad consensus indicates a negative association between 
disclosure policy and the cost of equity capital. 
In theory, the disclosure policy impact on the information asymmetry affecting the cost of debt capital 
should be similar to that on the cost of equity capital. This is explored further in the next section. 
13 Fore more detail on the findings ofthis study, refer to section 2.4.4. 
14 The three categories are annual reporting, other published information and investor relations. Refer to 2.2.1. 
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2.4.1.2 Cost of Debt 
The disclosure policy effect on the cost of debt is little researched but, nevertheless, of importance as 
debt financing is a major type of financing for publicly traded firms. Research on this subject arose as 
a response to the work on the cost of equity finance (Sengupta, 1998). 
Literature on the cost of debt generally describes a negative correlation between the cost of debt and 
the borrower's potential default risk (Fung & Rudd, 1986). Sengupta (1998) based his study on the 
assumption that lenders and underwriters consider a borrower's disclosure policy for their assessment 
of default risk. This suggests that firms with a policy of making adequate and timely disclosure are 
expected to withhold less value-relevant information and, as a result, should be charged a lower risk 
premlUm. 
Sengupta (1998) acknowledged that companies' disclosures are at best a noisy measure of their 
performance and therefore concluded that the content of any specific disclosure could decrease as well 
as increase a firm's default risk. However, as he focused on the overall disclosure effect over a number 
of years he hypothesised an inverse relationship between the observed disclosure policy and the cost 
of debt. He found that lenders rely more on disclosure where more uncertainty about a firm's future 
earnings existed. Moreover, he documented that companies with high levels of disclosure enjoy a 
1.2% lower yield to maturity and 2.1 % lower interest cost than companies with the lowest level of 
observed disclosure. These findings provide empirical evidence to the claim that lenders consider 
corporate disclosure policy in their estimate of default risk. 
The next section, a summary, concludes the review of the cost of capital. 
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2.4.1.3 Summary Cost of Capital 
Table 1 presents a tabular summary of the models suggested by contemporary researchers and their 
respective findings. The table shows all variables employed in order to facilitate the reader's 
understanding of the nature of control variables used by researchers to date. In addition, this enables a 
comparison with the approach taken within this study and may be useful for future research. 
Table 1. Summary: Cost of Capital Research 
AutBon+> ." . .• >..... jt~;ii"~";ili,~ . >;>;>?:;,; Sign . 2*izJ' . Signific811ce Level > ...... ...•. .ttl;.;. ,,,\lana .... 
Botosan, 1997,2000 Disclosure (annual report) - 1% 
Size (Mcap) - 5% 
Beta + 1% 
Botosan & Plumlee, 2002 Disclosure (annual report) Insignificant 
Annual Report 5% 
Other Publication + 5% 
Investor Relation - Insibrnificant 
Beta + 1% 
Size (Mcap) 1% 
Hail, 2001 Disclosure (annual report) - 1% 
Size (Mcap, Tot. A) + Insignificant 
Beta + 1% 
. 
Leverage - 1% 
Sengupta, 1998 Disclosure (overall) - 5% 
Size - Insignificant 
Years to Maturity + Insignificant 
Dummy: Debt Callable + Insignificant 
Dummy: Convertible Insignificant 
Dummy: Subordinated + 10% 
Debt/Equity (Mkt. Value) + 1% 
Margin - 10% 
Size (tot. Assets) - 1% 
Std. Dev. Daily Stock Ret. + 10% 
This section examined how literature to date found that disclosure policy, through lowering 
information asymmetry, affects the cost of capital. Despite measurement problems, disclosure poliey 
was shown to reduce both adverse selection and estimation risk which results in a lower cost of equity 
capital. Furthermore, empirical research findings suggest a negative relationship between disclosure 
policy and companies' cost of debt. 
The following section explains the different ways in which information asymmetry anses and 
develops empirical findings on the associated disclosure policy effects. 
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2.4.2 Information Asymmetry 
"Information asymmetry anses whenever market participants are pnvy to different levels of 
information" (Botosan, 2000: 61). There are two main categories of information asymmetry. Firstly, it 
exists between management and investors and, secondly, between investors. Both are symptoms of 
relative market inefficiency and found to diminish with improved disclosure. 
The agency problem is the source of the first branch of information asymmetry in the market. It arises 
because savers who invest in business ventures typically do not play an active role in their 
management. This function is delegated to the entrepreneur, who, once in control of the invested 
funds, has an incentive to transfer wealth or utility to himself through perquisites, excessive 
remuneration and investments that are harmful to shareholders (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Thus, information differential arises, where investors lack private information held 
by managers, which creates uncertainty about future returns or pay-off pattern. It also introduces an 
uncertainty risk to the valuation done by investors, who rely on corporate history and other disclosed 
information to estimate firms' ability to generate returns in excess of their cost of capital (Botosan, 
1997). It follows that increasing the information available should improve investors' ability to make 
precise forecasts of company returns and lower the estimation risk discount inherent in the cost of 
equity and debt capital (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Leuz & V errecchi a, 2000; Marquardt & 
Wiedman, 1998; Welker, 1995). 
The second category of information asymmetry, arising between investors, occurs where market 
participants gain access to private information (Botosan, 1997, 2000). Such information differentials 
between investors give rise to increased transaction costs as market participants price-protectl5 
(Welker, 1995) against potential adverse selection, which manifests itself in market illiquidity. 
Improving disclosure and making some private information public, reduces the risk of price protection 
(Lang & Lundholm, 1993), and as such, the information revealed by trades (Diamond & Verrecchia, 
1991). Zhang (2001) confirmed that private information based trades ultimately increase the cost of 
capital. 
Welker (1995) concluded that simultaneity may well exist between information asymmetry and 
disclosure policy. Hence, disclosure policy may depend on the information asymmetry perceived by 
management. Marquardt and Wiedman (1998) supported this suggestion by observing a positive 
15 Price protection is seen as unwillingness to trade and the demanding of discounts to offset potential losses from trades 
with better-informed parties. 
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relationship between managers' secondary equity offeringsl6 and the frequency of voluntary disclosure 
of earnings forecasts prior to the marketing of shares. In addition, they observed a significantly 
negative association between managerial participation and the two proxies of information 
asymmetry I 7 • Thus, their research indicates that executives manage earnings forecasts and other 
disclosure in anticipation of selling shares. Therefore, managers act as if disclosure lowers information 
asymmetry. Botosan and Harris (2000) and Healy et al. (1999) documented an increase in information 
asymmetry and a corresponding decrease in liquidity in the period prior to a change of disclosure 
frequency or level. This suggests that managers anticipate a disclosure policy effect on information 
asymmetry and liquidity and use their disclosure policies to achieve a given level thereof. 
In summary, disclosure policy appears negatively related to information asymmetry. Section 2.4.1 
developed the link between disclosure, information asymmetry and the cost of capital. Literature to 
date strongly suggests that improved reporting narrows the information gap across investors 
and, hence, diminishes the cost advantage of the better informed investor (Zhang, 2001). As 
information asymmetry represents a key component of firms' capital costs, the above effect should 
result in a reduction of capital costs, which benefits investors and managers alike. 
Empirically, different variables have been used to research information asymmetry. These are 
discussed in the next section. 
16 These offerings are sales of managers' personal equity holdings in their firms. 
17 The two proxies are analyst forecast accuracy and the timing of the equity offering registration relative to preceding 
quarterly earnings announcement. 
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2.4.3 Different Measures of Information Asymmetry 
There is little research guidance as to the most appropriate proxies for the information asymmetry 
component of the cost of capital (Core, 2001). One way of addressing this problem is to repeat tests on 
different measures of information asymmetry (Healy et aI., 99; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2001; Marquardt 
& Wiedman, 1998). This section explores three dominant proxies for information asymmetry, whieh 
are, in order of prominence (assessed in terms of their empirical popularity): the bid-ask spread, the 
trading volume and share price volatility. 
2.4.3.1 Bid-Ask Spread 
The bid-ask spread is the differenee between the bid price (the highest price a prospeetive buyer is 
willing to pay for a share) and the ask price (the lowest price at which a prospective seller is willing to 
sell a share). Because these two prices must meet for a transaction to occur, consistent large bid-ask 
spreads imply lower trading volume for a share and vice versa. Because it embodies the perceptions of 
both buyers and sellers, the use of the bid-ask spread as a "natural" (Bartov & Bodnar, 1996: 406) 
proxy for information asymmetry is widespread. Literature to date has established that information 
asymmetry manifests itself, inter alia, in transaction costsl 8. One way of measuring transaction costs is 
the bid-ask spread. In addition, the bid-ask spread is easily observed and accessible. 
Another way of linking information asymmetry to the bid-ask spread is through share liquidity. As 
explained in section 2.4.2, information asymmetry gives rise to adverse selection (Diamond & 
Verrecchia, 1991) and, consequently, illiquidity, which is observable in bid and asks prices. As a 
result, the bid-ask spread is used as a proxy for market liquidity l9. 
Empirically, the use of the bid-ask spread as a proxy for information asymmetry is not without 
criticism as it can be influenced by numerous determinants other than disclosure policy. Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000) stated that the bid-ask spread is negatively related to trading volume, share price 
and market maker competition and positively related to share price volatility and the presence of 
insiders. 
18 (Bens and Monahan 2001; Botosan 1997,2000; Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Healy et al. 
1999; Healy and Palepu 2001; Lang and Lundholm 2000; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Negash 2001; Welker 1995) 
19 (Bens and Monahan 2001; Botosan 1997,2000; Botosan and Harris 2000; Healy et at. 1999; 100s 2000; Leuz and 
Verrecchia 2000; Welker 1995) 
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In the South African context, N egash (2001) explained that the bid-ask spread can be disaggregated 
into three components: order-processing costs, inventory holding costs and an information related 
element. Literature to date attributes about 40% of the spread to information asymmetry. In his own 
analysis, Negash (2001) observed that the spread's information component for lSE listed firms is 
between 54% and 71 %. As such, the bid-ask spread should be suitable to the analysis of the disclosure 
policy effect on information asymmetry in South Africa. 
In summary, the bid-ask spread is traditionally the most favoured proxy for information asymmctry 
despite an ongoing debate surrounding its appropriateness as a variable due to the influence of non-
information factors such as share price volatility. 
2.4.3.2 Trading Volume 
As described above, information asymmetry manifests itself in adverse selection, which causes price-
protection and decreases baseline market liquidity (Welker, 1995). Another frequently used proxy for 
liquidity is the trading volume of a firm's share (Healy et al., 1999; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Negash, 
2001; Welker, 1995). 100s (2000) explained that this variable demonstrates investors' willingness to 
trade the shares of a firm, which in turn is influenced by the amount of information asymmetry 
(Welker, 1995). 
As with the bid-ask spread, the trading volume of a firm's security can be affected by several other 
non-information related factors (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). These factors include portfolio 
rebalancing, liquidity shocks and changes in risk preferences. As a result, the trading volume may not 
exclusively capture adverse selection amongst investors. In support of this, Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara and 
Paperman (1996) provided empirieal evidence that the probability of information-based trading 
decreases with trading volume. This indicates that the information asymmetry component of the 
trading volume falls as the volume of shares traded rises. Moreover, Bartov and Bodnar (1996) 
discussed how trading volume around information events can be positively related to disagreement 
between market participants regarding the firm's future. This disagreement can exist evcn where there 
is no information asymmetry. 
Hence, despite its secondary nature as a proxy for information asymmetry relative to the bid-ask 
spread, it is a widely used variable of information differentials. Research indicates that there are 
several theoretical challenges to its use. However, the variables' popularity appears to suggest that 
these are controllable. 
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2.4.3.3 Share Price Volatility 
A third and lesser-used proxy for information asymmetry is share price volatility (Bushee & Noe, 
2000; Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). In the absence of information asymmetry, 
share price movements should be smooth. Hence, low levels of volatility suggest little information 
asymmetry. Lang and Lundholm (1993) added that firms with volatile share prices might change their 
disclosure policy to address potential litigation costs that might arise from sudden price shocks. 
Bushee and Noe (2000) explained that share price volatility increases a firm's perceived investment 
risk and thereby increases its cost of capital. In addition, they found that it makes shareholder class-
action lawsuits more likely. Hence, share price volatility can be regarded as being costly for firms and, 
therefore, that they would benefit from its reduction. 
However, share price volatility, too, is subject to non-information related influence. In fact, out of the 
three proxies, it was assumed to be the noisiest measure of information asymmetry (Leuz & 
Verrecchia, 2000). In line with this expectation, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) were unable to document 
a statistically significant disclosure policy effect on share price volatility. Furthermore, Bushee and 
Noe (2000) showed that the relationship between disclosure and volatility is complex and that too 
much disclosure can, in fact, cause greater share price volatility. Botosan's and Plumlee's (2002) 
findings, linking timely disclosure to a higher cost of equity capital, supported this. 
Overall, share price volatility appears to be the least popular measure of information asymmetry due to 
the increased exposure to noise that is factored into firms' share prices. 
The following section summarises the research findings on information asymmetry and its three most 
popular proxies. 
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2.4.3.4 Summary - Three Measures of Information Asymmetry 
The following tabular summary (Table 2) illustrates the models and findings of contemporary 
researchers of information asymmetry. Again, all variables are shown for completeness. 
Table 2. Summary: Information Asymmetry Research 
'/ ,', !' Author<; 
," ~~h~/' ,.Variable Sign Signffican~Lgv4;}I' 
Botosan & Harris, 2000 Segment Reports Size (Mcap) +. 5% 
I Info Asymmetry - Insignificant 
! Analyst Following Eficant 
I Trading Volume + Insignificant 
Acquisition + ~ I Issue Debt/Equity + Insignificant 
Healy et al., 1999 Share Returns Earnings Change + Insignificant 
Earnings Level + 1% 
Beta + 1% 
Size (Total Assets) - Insi gni ficant 
Disclosure Dummy + 5% 
I 
Institutional O/Ship Earnings Change Insignificant 
Earnings Level + Insignificant 
Sales GroVvth -;- Insignificant 
Size (Total Assets) - 1% 
i Disclosure Dummy -r- 1% 
I Bid-Ask Spread Diselosure Dummy 10% 
i Size (Total Assets) - 1% 
I Trading Volume 1% 
i Share Price - Insignificant 
I Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000 Disclosure Dummy Size (Mcap) + Insignificant 
i Return on Assets + 7% 
I Free Float - Insignificant 
i Capital Intensity + Insi gnificant 
I U.K.lU.S. Listing i 1% 
Bid-Ask Spread Disclosure Dummy - 5% 
I Size (Mcap) - 1% 
i Trading Volume - 1% 
I Share Price Volatility + 1% 
I Free Float - 5% 
! Trading Volume Disclosure Dummy + 1% 
Size (Mcap) ~ Insignificant 
Share Price Volatility + 5% 
Free Float ~ 1% 
I Share Price Disclosure Dummy + 6°/ /0 
Size (Mcap) - 1% 
Free Float 5% 
Beta -:- 1% 
• Marquardt & Wiedman, 1998 Management Disclosure + 1% 
Participation Analyst Forecast Acc. - Insignificant 
Days to Register - 10% 
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Size of Offering 1% 
Tot. Mngmt. Holding + 1% 
Size (Mcap) - 5% 
Disclosure Mngmt Participation -+- 1% 
I Size (Mcap) + 5% 
His1. Earnings Variance Insignificant 
I I .~ • ngmt. Holding 5% 
. Analyst Forecast Acc. - 5% 
Days to Register Mngmt. Participation - 1% 
Size (Mcap) + Insignificant 
Residual Variance - Insignificant 
Tot. Mngmt. Holding - Insignificant 
Size of Offering - 10% 
Pre-Offer Return + 5% 
i Negash,2001 Weekly Spread Std Dev. Spread + 1% 
I 
I 
L-T Debt/Equity - 5% 
Std Dev. Share. P.t. - 5% ! 
A vg. weekly spread + 5% 
Adv. ScI. Component + 5% 
Mkt Liquidity Shares - 7% 
Asset Gro\vth + 10% 
Size (Total Assets) - 10% 
Share Liquidity EPS Insignificant 
Tot. Debt! Tot. Assets + Insignificant 
Welker, 1995 Relative Spreads Disclosure Score - 5% 
Std. Dev. Daily Returns + Insignificant 
Trading Volume 1% 
Mean Average Bid & Ask - 1% 
Dummy Var. High Price - 1% 
Dummy Var. Low Price - 1% 
Disclosure Score Market-adjusted Return + 5% 
Std. Dev. Daily Returns - Insignificant 
Relative Bid-Ask Spread - 6% 
Mean Average Bid & Ask - Insignificant 
Issue DebtlEquity + 5% 
This section built on the reader's understanding of the concept of information asymmetry and 
explained the three most prominent measures thereof, namely the bid-ask spread, trading volume and 
share price volatility. This included a review of pertinent research findings as well as a discussion of 
the empirical challenges encountered by researchers employing the mentioned variables in their 
studies. Lastly, Table 2 served to depict a tabular summary of the related research together with an 
account of all control variables used and their subsequent statistical validity. In addition to allowing 
for a comparison between literature to date and this study, it may also be useful to future research. 
This completes the explicit review of literature on the first research area within this study. The 
following section introduces analyst behaviour, the second area of research addressed within this 
study. 
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2.4.4 Analyst Behaviour 
Financial analysts play important capital market roles as information intermediaries, monitors of 
corporate performance and economic agents whose actions affect security pricing (Rock et ai., 2001). 
They engage in the production and communication of information that is not available or very costly 
to obtain for individual stakeholders. According to Lang and Lundholm (1996), U.S. analysts base 
their forecasts on the following factors: interviews with executives, reports to the SEC, annual 
financial statements, interim reports and, lastly, formal presentations by company executives. The 
processes underlying analyst behaviour have been the subject of various researchers' interest 
(Botosan, 1997, 2000; Bhushan, 1989; Hope, 2003; Kim et ai., 2001; King, Pownall & Waymire, 
1991; Lang & Lundholm, 1993, 1996; Rock et ai., 2001; Zhang, 2001). 
Within the framework ofliterature to date provided in section 2.2.3, the number of analysts' providing 
forecasts and their forecast accuracy have been analysed in Type I research as a proxy for information 
asymmetry (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Marquardt & Wiedman, 1998). Analyst behaviour in response 
to corporate reporting has only become of interest to contemporary accounting literature once 
researchers started to look at the connection between disclosure attributes and their impact on capital 
markets (Type II research). This section develops the different fields of analyst behaviour, which have 
been the subject of Type II research. Within this study, the term "analyst behaviour" captures the 
number of analysts following a firm, their forecast dispersion, their forecast accuracy and, lastly, their 
forecasts' revision volatility. These will be discussed below in the same sequence. 
2.4.4.1 lX umber of Analysts 
The majority of research on the number of analysts following a company focuses on non-disclosure 
related factors (Lang & Lundholm, 1996). Bhushan (1989), for example, found that the analyst 
following increases with firm size, institutional ownership and return variability. Lang and Lundholm 
(1993) substantiated this and added that analysts are more likely to attend meetings of larger 
companies. In addition, the media is more likely to carry news about larger companies. Thus, analysts 
can be expected to follow firms, for which greater investment interest exists. As the investor pool 
generally increases with firm size, more analysts will follow large companies, as they will be able to 
market their services better. 
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Bhushan (1989) set out that the equilibrium number of analysts will be determined by the intersection 
of thc aggregate demand and supply curves for analyst services. In this light, Lang and Lundholm 
(1996) examined how disclosure policy can be linked to the supply and demand curves and offered 
three different explanations of how more disclosure could affect the equilibrium number of analysts. 
Firstly, if information becomes less costly because it is reported by the firm directly instead of having 
to be acquired independently, more disclosure should, ceteris paribus, result in an increase of the 
aggregated supply of analysts. 
Secondly, assuming analysts act primarily as information intermediaries, an increase of information in 
the form of company disclosure would improve the economic value of analysts' reports and thus, 
ceteris paribus, result in an increase in aggregate demand for analyst services. 
Thirdly, if analysts are information providers who compete with company disclosure, then an increase 
in corporate disclosure would replace the analyst service, ceteris paribus, causing a lower equilibrium 
number of analysts. 
Overall, Lang and Lundholm (1996) expected a positive relationship between disclosure policy and 
the number of analysts. However, they cautioned that the net effect of the three competing theories 
would determine the outcome and that it could not be clearly predicted. Healy et al. (1999) confirmed 
this and expected the same positive association. 
Furthermore, Lang and Lundholm (1996) addressed causality. While it is understandable to assume 
that more disclosure may yield a greater analyst following, more analysts could also induce firms to 
improve their reporting. The latter view is supported by Botosan and Harris (2000) who, using a 
survey, found that the most frequently mentioned reason for initiating quarterly segmental disclosure 
was analyst pressure. In contrast, Lang and Lundholm (1996) who investigated lead and lag number of 
analysts found that a change in disclosure policy preceded changes in the analyst coverage. Although a 
chronological ordering of events does not necessarily establish causality, it does lend tentative 
evidence that disclosure policy changes the number of analysts following a particular company. 
All empirical researchers of companies' analyst coverage documented significant positive 
relationships between disclosure policy and analyst following. Healy et al. (1999) determined a 
significant increase in the median analyst following for their sample of companies, which exhibited 
sustained improvements in their disclosure policy. In addition, they found that the sample companies 
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had a lower average number of analysts before their disclosure improvement. Likewise, Botosan and 
Harris (2000) documented both higher information asymmetry prior to increases in disclosure 
frequency and increased analyst following in the financial period after the increase in disclosure. Thus, 
both studies underlined the relationship between information asymmetry and analyst following as 
suggested in Type I research. 
Lang and Lundholm (1996)20 documented a highly significant positive relationship between disclosure 
policy and the number of analysts, thus suggesting that analysts serve as information intermediaries 
who complement firm disclosure rather than act as a substitute for it. When the three disclosure 
categories were individually included in the regression model, annual reports did not add any 
explanatory power to the model, confirming that, as suggested by Botosan and Harris 2000, analysts 
rely more on personal communication with management than on annual reports. 
In summary, research to date alludes to a strong positive relationship between disclosure policy and 
the observed level of analysts following a company. Although not conclusive, the available evidence 
indicates that changes in disclosure policy precede changes in analyst following. 
The following section addresses the disclosure policy effect on forecast dispersion, i.e. the range of 
forecasts provided by individual analysts, which shows the extent to which analysts agree or disagree 
about future earnings. 
2.4.4.2 Forecast Dispersion 
The disclosure policy effect on forecast dispersion hinges on whether forecast variances amongst 
analysts are due to different information or different forecasting models (Lang & Lundholm, 1996). 
They put forward the following two alternative explanations. 
On the one hand, if analysts used the same forecasting model and observed the same firm-provided 
information but held different private information, such private information would become less 
important as the informativeness of firm-provided disclosure increased. This would increase the 
consensus amongst analysts. A negative relationship between disclosure policy and forecast dispersion 
would capture this effect. 
20 The researchers followed two parallel approaches: They ran one model with an aggregate disclosure proxy combining all 
three categories disclosure and one with all three as individual variables. This applied to all proxies for analyst behaviour. 
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On the other hand, if analysts observed the same firm-provided and private information but employed 
different forecasting models that are placing varying emphasis on the diverse components of firm-
provided information, additional disclosure would increase the dispersion among analyst forecasts. A 
positive relationship between disclosure policy and forecast dispersion would capture this effect 
(Kandel & Pearson, 1995). 
Healy et al. (1999) regarded forecast dispersion as a proxy for investor opinion. Their expectation of a 
negative relationship seems to conform to the belief that analysts use similar models but differ in the 
extent of private information held. Through studying firms exhibiting sustained disclosure 
improvements, they detected a statistically reliable decrease in median forecast dispersion. 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) documented a highly significant negative relationship between disclosure 
policy and analyst forecast dispersion. Firstly, this indicates that analysts use substantially the same 
forecast models and, secondly, that improved disclosure reduces the uncertainty regarding future 
earnings and improves forecast consensus. In this model, the annual report did add explanatory power 
in the predicted negative direction. The "other publications" score was significantly positive, which 
suggests that forecast dispersion increases with the amount of timcly disclosure provided. However, 
the fact that the overall disclosure score exhibited a negative sign suggests that the annual report and 
investor relations are more important media of firm disclosure when it comes to the dispersion of 
earnings forecasts. 
Hence, despite the lack of wide research on the impact of disclosure policy on analyst forecast 
dispersion, empirical evidence suggests that analysts use similar models to predict future earnings and 
that there is a negative disclosure policy effect. This means that improved corporate reporting can be 
associated with greater forecast consensus among analysts. 
The next section introduces the third aspect of analyst behaviour under consideration within this study, 
namely analyst forecast accuracy. 
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2.4.4.3 Forecast Accuracy 
The theoretical relationship between disclosure policy and forecast accuracy is more straightforward 
than the first two relationships presented above. Analysts face uncertainties related to both economic 
affairs and the accounting alternatives used by firms (Hope, 2003). To the extent that corporate 
disclosure reveals information that is relevant to future earnings, forecast accuracy should increase 
with disclosure policy. Lang and Lundholm (1996) added that it is difficult to imagine scenarios, 
barring fraudulently misleading disclosure, where disclosure reduces analysts' forecast accuracy. 
In line with this expectation, Lang and Lundholm (1996) documented significant positive results for 
the total disclosure score, implying that corporate disclosure policy is an important determinant of 
forecast accuracy. When individually regressed, the annual report category was not significant, which 
suggests that timely disclosures and direct analyst contact are more important factors in the 
determination of accurate forecasts. 
Moreover, they found analyst forecast accuracy was positively correlated with company size which 
supports Healy et at. (1999) who expressed that larger corporations have more diversified operations, 
making it easier to predict earnings. Although literature to date indicates that geographic segmental 
reporting makes forecasts more accurate (Botosan & Harris, 2000), Durn & Reeb (2002) showed that 
internationally diversified firms can be associated with less accurate and more optimistic analyst 
forecasts. This indicates that international diversification brings about unique forecasting difficulties 
that have not been captured by prior literature. Lim (2001) added that earnings forecasts are more 
optimistically biased towards firms with less predictable earnings. 
Across different countries, Hope (2003) documented that the observed level of company disclosure is 
significantly positively related to forecast accuracy. 
In summary, literature to date indicates that disclosure policy is positively associated with accurate 
analyst forecasts. This was confirmed using various research designs, such as around the adoption of 
supposedly more stringent reporting standards or across different countries. 
The following section discusses the volatility of forecast revisions, This completes the review of 
literature on the disclosure policy effect on analyst behaviour. 
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2.4.4.4 Volatility of Forecast Revisions 
The volatility of forecast revisions during the period prior to the announcement of earnings is likely to 
be reduced by more forthcoming reporting policies (Lang & Lundholm, 1996). The same authors 
stated that the timeliness of the reporting of earnings-relevant news forms part of the informativeness 
of corporate disclosure. 
Williams (1996) advocated that the magnitude of the adjustment of forecasts, which give rise to the 
revision volatility, is a function of the usefulness of the previous management forecast. Lang and 
Lundholm (1996) added that where companies release news as it occurs, the magnitude of revisions is 
likely to be smaller than when all news is released at once at a later stage. 
According to expectation, Lang and Lundholm (1996) found that their total disclosure score was 
significantly negatively associated with forecast revision volatility. However, when individually 
regressed only the investor relations category was significant, thus confirming the notion that firms 
can reduce the probability of large revisions through investor relations efforts. 
In summary, the volatility of forecast revisions is the least researched measure of analyst behaviour. 
According to research findings, disclosure policy exhibits a negative effect on it. It therefore appears 
as if more disclosure to the capital market reduces the likelihood of significant forecast revisions. 
The following section summanses research findings of the disclosure policy effect on analyst 
behaviour. 
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2.4.4.5 Summary - Analyst Behaviour 
Table 3 presents a tabular summary of the models and findings of researchers of analyst behaviour to 
date. For completeness, all models are shown with the accompanying control variables. 
Table 3. Summary: Analyst Behaviour Research 
•••••••••••••••• 
Author ii' Mod t~ ..... Ie ,)i;Variable. .....•....... Sign"" SignifitaQCe 
.. " 
' .•. ".·e .:".... . 
Duro & Reeb, 2002 Forecast Accuracy International Diversification 1% 
Industry Diversification Insignificant 
Size (Mcap) Insi gni ficant 
Loss made in Fin Year - Insignificant 
Earnings Skewness - 1% 
Change in Earnings - 1% 
Earnings Volatility - 10% 
Forecast Horizon - 5% 
Number of Analysts + 10% 
Forecast Dispersion - 1% 
Forecast Bias International Diversification + 1% 
Industry Diversification + Insignificant 
Size (Mcap) + Insignificant 
Loss madc in Fin Year + Insignificant 
Earnings Skewness + 1% 
Change in Earnings + 1% 
Earnings Volatility + Insignificant 
Forecast Horizon ""- Insignificant 
I Number of Analysts - Insignificant 
i Forecast Dispersion - 1% 
Healy et aI., 1999 Analyst Following Disclosure Dummy + 1% 
Earnings Level 5% 
Earnings Change - 10% 
_ .. 
Size (Total Assets) + 1% 
Share Returns 10% 
I I Sales Growth - Insignificant 
F'cast Dispersion Disclosure Dummy - Insignificant 
Earnings Level + Insignificant 
Earnings Change Insignificant 
Size (Total Assets) - Insignificant 
r- Beta - Insignificant 
Sales Growth - 10% 
L Hope, 2003 Forecast Accuracy Annual Report Disclosure + 1% 
and Enforcement Enforcement 1% 
Share Exchange Listings + 1% 
1 Analyst following -'- 1% 
Finn Size - 5% 
L Earnings Change 1% 
Negative Earnings Insignificant 
Uncertainty A voidance + 5% 
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Individualism + 10% 
Domestic Listed Farms Insignificant 
Common Law + 10% 
Earnings Surprise Mngmt + ! 5% 
Forecast Accuracy Annual Report Disclosure + 
1
1% 
and Disclosure Qty Enforcement + 1% 
Share Exchange Listings Insignificant 
Choice 1% 
Analyst following + 1% 
Size - Insignificant 
Earnings Change - 1% 
! Negative Earnings - Insignificant 
Uncertainty A voidance + 1% 
Individualism + Insignificant 
Domestic Listed Farms - 10 
Earnings Surprise Mngmt + 1% 
Lang & Lundholm, 1996 Analyst Following Annual Report + Insignificant 
• 
Other Publication + 5% 
Investor Relations + 5% 
Total Disclosure Score + 1% 
Size (Mcap) + 1% 
StdDev. ROE Insignificant 
Return-Earnings Correlation - 5% 
Std Dev Forecasts Annual Report - 1% 
Other Publication + Insignificant 
Investor Relations - 5% 
Total Disclosure Score - 1% 
Size (Mcap) 1% 
! StdDev. ROE + 1% 
Return-Earnings Correlation - 1% 
Earnings Surprise + 1% 
%New Forecasts t- 1% 
Forecast Accuracy Annual Report - Insignificant 
Other Publication ..... 5% 
Investor Relations + 1% 
Total Disclosure Score + 1% 
Size (Mcap) -'- 1% 
StdDev. ROE Insignificant 
Return-Earnings Correlation - Insi gni ficant 
• 
Earnings Surprise - 1% 
I 
%New Forecasts 
- 1% 
Volatility Forecast Annual Report - Insignificant 
I 
Revisions Other Publication Insignificant 
Investor Relations - 1% 
~. _ ..... 
• 
Total Disclosure Score - 1% 
i 
Size (Mcap) - 1% 
StdDev. ROE + 1% 
Return-Earnings Correlation + Insignificant 
Earnings Surprise + 1% 
f----
%New Forecasts + 1% 
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i Marquardt & Wiedman, 1998 Forecast Accuracy Management Participation 1% 
I Size (Mcap) 5% 
Hist. Earnings Variance - Insignificant 
Std. Dev. F'castJAvg. F'cast -'- 1% 
I Rock et ai., 2001 Analyst Following Number Inst. Shareholders + 1% 
%Shares held by Institutions !+ 5% 
Return Variance + 5% 
R2 Co Return on Mkt Model + • 1% 
Diversification - Insignificant 
Size (Mcap) + 1% 
%Shares held by Insiders - 6% 
This section expanded the topic of analyst behaviour in response to disclosure policy. It was shown 
that for the purpose of this study, analyst behaviour relates to the number of analysts following a 
company, the dispersion of their forecasts, their forecast accuracy and the volatility of forecast 
revisions. Each of the four elements of analyst behaviour was presented separately and discussed in 
the context of literature to date and its empirical findings. It was found that the number of analysts and 
forecast accuracy are the most prominently researched variables. An inspection of Table 3 confirms 
this. It also shows the different models employed by researchers of analyst behaviour and disclosure 
policy together with the statistical validity of their specifications. It provides an overview of the 
approaches taken by contemporary researchers and may serve as a starting point for possible future 
research. 
The remainder of this literature reVIew IS devoted to the development of the control variables 
necessary to single out the effect of the disclosure policy on information asymmetry and analyst 
behaviour. Both Table 2 and Table 3 indicate that this requires a number of control variables. As such, 
it becomes necessary to develop the purpose of each of these on the anticipated models described in 
Chapter 3. 
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2.5 Control Variables 
2.5.1 Size - Overview 
Of all control variables, size is the only one that affects both information asymmetry and analyst 
behaviour. Hence, to avoid repetition, the size effects applicable to both research areas are presented 
together whilst the findings specific to only one of the two research areas are described within their 
own sections. 
As mentioned earlier, the research findings discussed in this section can be attributed to Type I 
research, which focussed on the relationship between the disclosure environment and disclosure 
attributes. The most significant and most established control variable from such Type I disclosure 
research is company size. Most researchers expect a positive relationship between company size and 
the level of disclosure21 . It therefore follows that company size represents the primary control variable 
in the analyses conducted within this study. 
Buzby (1975) put forward that small firms may not possess the necessary resources for collecting and 
presenting costly high quality information. Owusu-Ansah (1998) and Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
suggested that proprietary information, such as information regarding research and development, is 
more integral to their competitive advantage and corporate survival. In addition, they noted that the 
cost of collecting and presenting information is more onerous for small companies. Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) hypothesised that there is a fixed component to disclosure cost, so that the cost per 
unit of size decreases. This implies that reporting per unit of information is cheaper for larger firms 
As corporations grow In SIze, their capital structure becomes more important to their goal of 
maximising shareholder value and they increasingly rely on public financing. Therefore, larger 
corporations become more active in capital markets (Inchausti, 1997). As companies become more 
dependent on public investment, increasing the marketability of their securities becomes more of an 
incentive to improve their disclosure (Lang & Lundholm, 1993, 2000; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002). 
21 Empirical findings in the following countries confirm this hypothesis: The USA (Buzby, 1975; Botosan, 1997, 2000; 
Botosan & Harris, 2000; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Healy et al..1999; Lang & Lundholm, 1993, 
1996), the UK (Firth, 1979; Wallace, Choudhury & Adhikari, 1999); Sweden (Cooke, 1989); Spain (Wallace et al., 1994; 
Inchausti, 1997); Japan (Cooke, 1991), Zimbabwe (Owusu-Ansah, 1998); Mexico (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987), South 
Africa (Crosoer, 2003; Negash, 2001) and the Czech Republic (Patton and Zelenka, 1997). 
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In summary, the majority of researchers in this field assume a positive relationship between size and 
disclosure policy. The majority of contemporary researchers chose market capitalisation as their proxy 
c . 22 lor company sIze . 
The remainder of this section details the hypothesised impact of company size and the remaining 
control variables on information asymmetry and analyst behaviour. 
2.5.2 Information Asymmetry 
2.5.2.1 Size 
There are several size effects on information asymmetry. Bid-ask spreads, in general, diminish with 
size. This means that, expressed as a percentage of share price, bid-ask spread are smaller for large 
firms and are relatively smaller for larger share prices and vice versa (loos, 2000). This effect should 
be controlled for as it persists even in the absence of information asymmetry (Welker, 1995). 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) added that the cost of disseminating information is higher for smaller 
companies as the media are less likely to publish their news. 
According to a study by Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), the reduction of information revealed by 
large trades and the reduetion of adverse selection is greater for larger firms, which, hence, have a 
greater incentive to subscribe to higher levels of disclosure. In addition, large companies are more 
dependent on institutional investors (Healy et at., 1999) who require more baseline market liquidity 
(Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). As a result, they should be more inclined to disclose information than 
smaller firms that are less dependent on large shareholders. 
In short, research conducted to date indicates that company size is an important explanatory variable 
of the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread. Therefore, omitting it from statistical 
analysis might give rise to spurious conclusions. 
22 (Botosan, 1997, 2000; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Bushee & Noe, 2000; Hail, 2001; Healy et at., 1999; Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993, 1996; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Lundholm & Myers, 2002; Marquardt & Wiedman, 1998; Negash, 
2001; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Sengupta, 1998; Wallace et at., 1994) 
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2.5.2.2 Trading Volume 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) described how share trades reveal value-relevant information to the 
market. To the extent that trades reveal information, adverse selection, which is the risk of trading 
with a better-informed party, exists (Botosan, 1997,2000). 
Easley et al. (1996) provided empirical evidence that the probability of information-based trading 
decreases in trading volume. Put differently, bid-ask spreads decrease with trading volume (Welker, 
1995). In order to avoid attributing this effect to companies' disclosure policy, it is necessary to adjust 
for the level of trading volume. In addition, Welker (1995) used trading volume as an inverse variable 
for market makers' inventory holding period based on the assumption that as a share is traded more 
frequently, less inventory needs to be held to facilitate smooth matching of buy and sell orders. 
2.5.2.3 Return Volatility 
Bushee and Noe (2000) noted that share price volatility increases a firm's perceived investment risk 
and thereby increases its cost of capital. Although this type of risk relates to share returns, its effect is 
tantamount to uncertainty regarding a firm's payoff pattern. From this point of view, it has the same 
effect on the cost of capital as information asymmetry but possibly has different causes. Because it is 
negatively related to the bid-ask spread, it needs to be included in its regression models (Welker, 
1995). This should avoid drawing incorrect conclusions based on an omitted variable bias. 
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2.5.3 
2.5.3.1 
Analvst Behaviour 
Size 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) noted that analysts are more likely to attend the meetings of larger 
companies. Analysts sell their services and are thus more likely to operate where the demand for their 
services is greater. As the number of analysts following a finn is set by the aggregate demand and 
supply for their services (Bhushan, 1989), corporate size needs to be adjusted for when investigating 
the disclosure effect on companies' analyst following. 
In a later study, Lang and Lundholm (1996) argued that if size was excluded from the analysis, a 
significant relationship between analysts and disclosure could be established even if the real 
explanatory variable were to be finn size. Bhushan's (1989) empirical observation of a significant 
positive association between size and the number of analysts supports this view. Hope (2003) added 
that size is positively associated with the availability of infonnation that does not stem from company 
disclosure. 
Healy et al. (1999) noted that larger companies typically provide more infonnation to analysts and 
have more diversified investments, which make their perfonnance more predictable. This increases 
analyst consensus. Consequently, they integrate size as a control variable and expect a negative 
coefficient with forecast dispersion. 
In summary, size remains an important control variable that is used by the majority of contemporary 
researchers of analyst behaviour to avoid an omitted variable bias based on non-disclosure infonnation 
available in the market, which could cause spurious conclusions. 
2.5.3.2 Historic Standard Deviation of Return on Equity 
This variable is an indicator of the complexity of the forecasting task. Durn and Reeb (2002) 
concluded that, inter alia, the forecast accuracy and the number of analysts following a company are a 
function of the difficulty of the forecasting task. Their finding that internationally active finns are 
associated with less accurate forecasts seems to support this opinion. 
Zhang (2001) detennined earnings volatility to be one of the critical components of finns' analyst 
following. If variation in the observed level of companies' disclosure policies is due to earnings 
volatility, a positive relationship between disclosure and analyst following should occur. 
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2.5.3.3 Return-Earnings Correlation 
This variable is an indicator of the relationship between share returns and earnings over the preceding 
ten years. It indicates to what extent earnings explain returns. King et al. (1990) argued that analyst 
following is likely to be positively associated with share-return-earnings correlations as it is easier to 
predict future share prices based on earnings forecasts for such firms. Expressed in terms of Zhang's 
(2001) model, this would mean that analysts are more likely to follow a firm where the information 
production cost is lower. Lang and Lundholm (1993) determined a negative correlation between the 
observed return-earnings correlations and firms' disclosure policies. They interpreted that low return-
earnings correlations indicate that earnings do not capture value-relevant information and that more 
disclosure is necessary as a result. 
2.5.3.4 Earnings Surprise 
This variable was introduced by Lang and Lundholm (1996) and was included only in forecast 
characteristics models and not in models examining the disclosure policy effect on analyst following. 
It controls for the fact that earnings forecasts are affected by the magnitude of the earnings information 
to be disclosed. Lang and Lundholm (1996) illustrated this by means of a simple example where a 
company introduces a major new product. Realised earnings are likely to deviate substantially from 
expected earnings; consensus is likely to be low and significant revisions of earnings forecasts become 
probable. Including the earnings surprise in forecast characteristics models should thus adjust for such 
potential bias. 
2.5.3.5 N umber of Analysts 
Hope (2003) showed that an important control variable in the analysis of analyst forecast accuracy is 
the number of analysts following a firm. Similar to Type I literature, the numbers of analysts are a 
proxy for the information environment in which forecasts are made. In addition, Hope (2003) included 
the number of analysts to control for their incentive to issue more accurate forecasts when greater 
competition exists amongst them. Durn and Reeb (2002) noted that the number of analysts is a 
measure of forecasting complexity. 
Forecast accuracy was found to increase with the number of analysts (Durn & Reeb, 2002; Rock et aI., 
2001 ). 
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2.5.3.6 Percentage New Forecasts 
Lang and Lundholm (1996: 478) introduced this parameter to deal with potential1y "stale" database 
entries. Analyst forecasts, which were not updated in a given month, are still included in the database 
accessed by the researchers. However, it is impraetical to determine whether unchanged estimates 
reflect the analysts' best estimates or whether they simply opted not to re-estimate earnings. 
Controlling for the effect of new forecasts reduces any systematic variation across observations due 
solely to differences in the proportion of recently revised forecasts. Further tests suggested that 
"staleness" was not a problem and that tests including and excluding the variable were consistent. 
However, as the possibility of "staleness" cannot be ruled out, Lang and Lundholm (1996) included it 
in their model and found it to be highly significant. No other known researcher employed a similar 
factor. 
2.6 South African Studies 
Negash (2001) published what appears to be the only South African study on information asymmetry 
and uncertainty in the local capital market. His study investigated the relationship between corporate 
disclosure and the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread of share prices. He decoupled the 
effect of order-processing and holding costs embodied in bid-ask spreads. Initial results suggested that 
there is some association between annual report disclosure and the size of the spread's information 
eomponent. Further tests, however, showed that the putative relationship is not of strong linearity. In a 
later study, Negash (2002) found that changes in the bid-ask spread explain changes in the market 
(price) to book ratio and are correlated with proxies for intangible assets. However, because his later 
study ignored the effect of company disclosure it is of limited relevance to this study. 
Crosoer (2003) conducted a study of company characteristics associated with the observed level of 
disclosure. Although his research should be classified as Type I and is, hence, different in nature to 
this study, he empirically confirmed prior literature's findings on the control variable size in the South 
African context. 
Hamann (2003) researched corporate social responsibility in the South African context. Although he 
eoncluded that South African firms are active social reporters relative to international companies, he 
made no use of statistical analysis. In addition, his study did not examine any possible disclosure 
policy effect related to social reporting. Hence, his research is oflimited relevance to this study. 
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Hope (2003) conducted an international study of the impact of disclosure practices and the 
enforcement of accounting standards on the accuracy of analyst forecast accuracy. Out of a sample of 
22 countries, South African analysts took the ninth place in terms of forecast accuracy, ahead of 
developed countries such as Germany, Hong Kong, Denmark and Italy. However, his study's sample 
size per country was below 20 and no selection criteria were mentioned. Hence, due to the small 
sample size and methodology, the comparability between his study and this research is limited. 
The South African literature presented above sheds only limited light on the research objectives 
pursued within this study. The first (Negash, 2001, 2002) reported a dearth of significant results, the 
second one (Crosoer, 2003) only provided more insight into one of the proposed control variables 
whilst the third (Hamann, 2003) added to our knowledge of social development reporting, which is not 
directly related to this study. Finally, the fourth and last study on the South African context (Hope, 
2003) only considered a small sample with limited explanation as to the methodology followed. 
2.7 Summary - Literature Review 
Research on company disclosure has seen a fundamental shift in focus over the last decade. It has 
changed from the relationship between environmental factors and disclosure attributes (Type I) to that 
between disclosure attributes and their impact (Type II). Only the latter category was reviewed in 
depth as this study contributes to the research on the disclosure policy effect on capital markets. 
Within this study, the observed level of disclosure is assumed to be due to an active choice rather than 
being an externally set parameter. Thus, the observed level of reporting represents a disclosure policy. 
While many contemporary researchers investigated all three categories of disclosure, the annual report 
remains the major component of company disclosure (Hope, 2003) and an accepted proxy for a 
company's overall reporting efforts (Botosan, 1997). 
The ultimate disclosure policy effect was found to be a lower cost of equity capital (Botosan, 2000). 
The majority of all other effects are either subsidiary to the cost of capital or represent components 
thereof, such as the effect on information asymmetry (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Healy & Palepu, 
2001; Zhang, 2001). Despite detailed theoretical research, measurement challenges have hindered 
widespread empirical research on the disclosure policy effect on the cost of capital. Botosan (1997, 
2000) was the first known empirical researcher to close this gap. She devised a two-tiered framework, 
which showed how disclosure reduces information asymmctry and thus gives rise to a lower cost of 
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equity capital. She then confirmed her framework empirically for firms with low analyst following. 
Hail (2001), found stronger evidence of the same effect in a less stringent reporting environment. 
Other contemporary research showed that disclosure policy is negatively related to the level of 
information asymmetry, which is a key component of the cost of capital. It is commonly measured by 
bid-ask spreads, trading volume and return volatility. Research found that more disclosure reduces 
estimation risk (Botosan, 1997) and the amount of information revealed by large trades (Diamond & 
Verrecchia, 1991) and, so, increases market liquidity (Welker, 1995). 
Financial analysts play an important role as economic agents that produce and disseminate company 
information (Rock et al., 2001). Lang and Lundholm (1996) documented a positive disclosure policy 
effect on analyst following, suggesting that analysts act as information intermediaries rather than as 
competitors of company information. 
They found a negative relationship between disclosure policy and analysts' forecast dispersion, which 
suggests that analysts use the same forecasting models. 
In the field of forecast accuracy, Lang and Lundholm (1996) observed a positive disclosure policy 
effect. However, the evidence on the effect of company diversification on forecast accuracy remains 
mixed. 
The volatility of forecast revisions is negatively related to disclosure policy (Lang & Lundholm, 1996) 
while timely disclosure was also found to result in reduced volatility. 
Altogether, the above review of contemporary literature of the disclosure policy effect demonstrates 
several important capital market benefits. The majority of the above findings were made in 
international research. This study uses that international knowledge and tests whether similar 
disclosure policy effects can be determined empirically in the South African context. Chapter 3 
presents the methodology adopted to study the existence of local disclosure policy effects on 
information asymmetry and analyst behaviour. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the methodology chosen to achieve the objectives set out in Chapter 1. The 
objectives can be disaggregated into two groups. Firstly, this study examines the disclosure policy 
effect on the level of observed information asymmetry. Secondly, it investigates the existence of a 
disclosure policy effect on analyst behaviour. 
Chapter 3 begins with a discussion of the sample selection process, which is based on an annual E&Y 
survey of Excellence in Corporate Reporting. This is followed by an overview and detailed description 
of all variables employed within this investigation. Each dependent variable is presented together with 
its related hypothesis. This is complemented by a description of the statistical procedures chosen to 
test the hypotheses embodying the research objectives. Lastly, Chapter 3 ends with an outline of the 
methodology'S limitations. 
3.2 Sample Selection: E&Y Excellence in Corporate Reporting 
The obvious limitation to any study involving company disclosure is the availability of an objective 
rating thereof. This rating process is an onerous task that demands considerable time, knowledge, 
experience, care and objectivity. As such, it is seen as a significant impediment to disclosure related 
research and a limitation to possible findings, as sample sizes are natural1y restricted (Botosan, 2000; 
Michailesco, 2001). Internationally, some researchers overcame this by designing and executing their 
own rating methodologies (Michailesco, 2001), a process which may expose subsequent findings to 
certain biases. This approach was more common amongst Type I researchers. 
The majority of contemporary Type II researchers employ independent measures of disclosure policies 
(mostly AIMR ratings) to avoid any bias. In an effort to conform to this practice, this study is based on 
the annual E&Y survey of Excellence in Corporate Reporting23 . The survey's objective is to 
23 Prior to that prior to 2003, the survey was named "Excellence in Financial Reporting". 
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encourage excellence in the quality of financial reporting which appears comparable to the AIMR 
ratings' objective which is to encourage improved reporting and disclosure. 
The E&Y survey samples the largest 100 South African JSE listed companies as determined by their 
market capitalisation on 31 October. This study considers four years starting from 2000. It was 
impractical to extend the sample period to years dating before 2000, as a change to the rating 
methodology was made in that year. The fact that only four years of comparable data were available 
gave rise to the cross-sectional regression analyses discussed later in this Chapter. Although the 
sample is determined on 31 October of a given year, the survey results are only published in the first 
half of the following year to allow for the adjudication process to occur. As a result, the first survey 
year considered within this study is the 2001 year. A list of the sample companies is provided in 
Appendix A. 
An inspection of Appendix A also reveals that the companies within the samples vary over the four 
years. This is because the deciding factor, market capitalisation, is subject to fluctuation. This is not 
expected to introduce a bias as no statistical analysis is performed over time (time-series testing). The 
proposed regression analysis is performed at one point in time (cross-sectional testing). For more 
detail, refer to section 3.8.1, which presents an overview of the statistical analyses. 
For more information on the E&Y survey, refer to section 3.5.2.1, which describes the variable that 
was derived from the survey. 
The next section presents an overview of the data and its sources. 
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3.3 Data - An Overview 
The data required for this study was obtained from a variety of sources, some of which are (a) not 
public, such as the disclosure scores and (b) are only available to database subscribers, such as I-Net, 
McGregor and IIB/E/S. Data from IIB/E/S via Thomson Financial was obtained specifically for this 
research. For a variety of reasons, not all data was available for all companies. Some companies were 
delisted or deregistered between the applicable survey year and the time this study was conducted. 
Such companies were removed from the sample, as a result of data unavailability. Section 4.2.1 
presents a reconciliation of the number of original sample companies and the final samples. Table 4 
and Table 5 present summaries of the variables employed within the study, their measurement as well 
as their source. This is shown separately for each of the two areas of study: information asymmetry 
and analyst behaviour. A detailed account of how the individual variables were collected is presented 
together with the variable description in sections 3.4 to 3.6. 
Table 4. Summary of Data: Information Asymmetry 
. Data utilised'in Analysis .:j;") c';XbbreVlati Measurement ; ..... DitaSOlrrce' 
Dependent Variables 
1. Bid-Ask Spread Spread Calculated I-Net 
2. Trading Volume Vol Calculated I-Net 
Independent Variables 
1. Disclosure Score Score Calculated E&Y Survey 
2. Company Size (30/10] Size Calculated I-Net 
3. Trading Volume Vol Calculated I-Net 
4. Return Volatility Ret Vol Calculated I-Net 
For a descnptlOn of how vanables are calculated, refer to the detailed descnptlOn proVided In thiS chapter. 
Table 5. Summary of Data: Analyst Behaviour 
Data utilised in Anhlysis; ~ ! Abbreviation Measurement Data Source 
Dependent Variables 
1. Number of Analyst~ #Anlyst Downloaded I1B/E/S Via Thomson 
2. Forecast Dispersion ForDisp Calculated I/B/E/S VIa Thomson 
3. Forecast Accuracy ForAcc Calculated I/B/E/S Via Thomson 
4. Forecast Revision Volatility Rev Vol Calculated I1B/E/S vIa Thomson 
i Independent Variables 
1. Disclosure Score Score Calculated E&Y Survey 
2. Company Size [3011 0] Size Calculated I-Net 
... Rist. Std. Dev. ROE HSDROE Calculated McGregor .). 
4. Return-Earnings Correlation R-ECorr Calculated McGregor & IJB/E/S 
5. Earnings Surprise EarnSurp Calculated I1B/E/S via Thomson 
6. Number of Analysts #Anlyst Downloaded I/B/E/S via Thomson 
For a descnptlon of how vanables are calculated, refer to the detailed descnptlOn proVIded In thiS chapter. 
The following section discusses the variables summarised above in more detail. 
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3.4 Variables Selected 
This study employs eight explanatory variables to analyse the six dependent variables representing 
infonnation asymmetry and analyst behaviour characteristics relating to the sample companies. All 
variables selected were previously researched internationally within the literature discussed in 
Chapter 2. Their selection should thus ensure comparability between this study's findings and those of 
international research. This section continues with a detailed review of how the dependent and 
independent variables were chosen, measured and obtained. This infonnation is presented separately 
for infonnation asymmetry and analyst behaviour. 
3.5 Information Asymmetry 
3.5.1 Dependent Variables 
Out of the three general proxies for infonnation asymmetry, namely the bid-ask spread, trading 
volume and share price volatility, only the fanner two were chosen. Share price volatility was 
excluded from the empirical analysis to avoid the effect of stock market noise. In addition, this 
decision was influenced by previous researchers' lack of significant findings (Leuz & Verrecchia, 
2000; Welker, 1995). Lastly, this decision was driven by the conclusion drawn by Joos (2000) that 
share priee volatility is the weakest proxy for infonnation asymmetry. 
3.5.1.1 Bid-Ask Spread (Spread) 
The bid-ask spread represents the difference between quoted bid and ask prices. It is chosen as a 
measure of infonnation asymmetry as it embodies the degree of price-protection (Welker, 1995) and 
market illiquidity due to adverse selection (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). As such, it is an explicit 
measure of infonnation asymmetry (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). The choice of the bid-ask spread as a 
proxy for infonnation asymmetry is consistent with Healy et al. (1999), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), 
Negash (2001) and Welker (1995). 
For the purpose of this study, monthly spreads are used. This is consistent with Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000) and Welker (1995). Following Healy et al. (1999), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Negash 
(200l), the spread is expressed as a percentage of the average bid and ask prices. This expresses the 
bid-ask spread as a ratio, which enhances cross-sectional comparability and achieves economic 
interpretability (Welker, 1995). To obtain an annual figure, the average spread over the twelve months 
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is detennined (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). N egash (2001) suggests a procedure to extract the adverse 
selection component from the bid-ask spread. He finds that the adverse selection component accounts 
for between 54% and 70% of South African spreads in contrast to about 40% internationally. This is 
probably due to the order-driven nature of the JSE, which eliminates inventory holding costs. 
Consequently, Negash (2001) includes the unmanipulated spreads in his model. This study adopts the 
same approach. The variable (in each of the four years) is calculated as follows: 
Spread {[(S d 
Ash - Bidt 
prea t = h * (Askt + Bidt) + ... + ( Spread,." 
Where: 
Spreadt 
Spreadt+12 
Askt 
Bidt 
Spread in month t 
Spread in month t + 12 
Asking Priee in month t 
Bidding Price in month t 
Askt + 12 - Bidt + 12 ]*1!12} h * (Askt + 12 + Bidr + 12) 
(Equation 1) 
The bid and ask prices necessary to calculate the bid-ask spreads used within this study were obtained 
from I-Net using the I-Connect function for direct volume downloads. 
The following hypothesis is tested (stated in its alternative fonn): 
HI: There is a positive relationship between disclosure policy and the bid-ask spread. 
3.5.1.2 Trading Volume (Vol) 
The trading volume represents the extent to which a company's shares are traded in the market. It is 
chosen as proxy for infonnation asymmetry as it embodies the securities' liquidity (Diamond & 
Verrecchia, 1991; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Negash, 2001; Welker, 1995). Such liquidity is 
negatively affected by adverse selection (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991), which gives rise to priee-
protection (Welker, 1995). 
The choice to use this variable as a proxy for infonnation asymmetry and its measurement are 
consistent with Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Negash (2001). To achieve cross-sectional 
comparability, it is scaled by the respective market capitalisation and expressed as an average of the 
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twelve monthly observations (Healy et al., 1999; Welker, 1995). The variable (in each of the four 
years) is calculated as follows: 
Where: 
SPr * NSt ) [ + ... + Volt+12 
Mkt CaPt 
S~+12 * NSI+12 )] * 1 1l2} 
Mk1: _ CaPt+12 
NS 1+12 
Mkt Capt 
Mkt _Cap /+ 12 
Share Price in month t 
Share Price in month t + 12 
Number of Shares traded in month t 
Number of Shares traded in month t + 12 
Market Capitalisation in month t 
Market Capitalisation in month t 12 
(Equation 2) 
The data necessary to calculate this variable was obtained from I-Net using the I-Connect function for 
direct volume downloads. 
The following hypothesis is tested (stated in its alternative form): 
H2: There is a positive relationship between disclosure policy and trading volume. 
3.5.2 Independent Variables 
This section continues with a description of the explanatory variables chosen to model the disclosure 
policy effect on the observed information asymmetry. 
3.5.2.1 Disclosure Score (Score) 
The disclosure score is the average of the individual scores determined by three independent 
adjudicators within the E&Y survey of Excellence in Corporate Reporting. All three are South African 
chartered accountants and senior accountancy professors at the University of Cape Town. As such, the 
disclosure score is expected to have the necessary objectivity that is required for this study. Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000) confirmed the validity of university staff as adjudicators for the purpose of 
assessing company disclosure. 
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In the rating process, the adjudicators assess each annual report in terms of its performance review, 
financial disclosure, forward-looking information and presentation. The final score, the average of the 
three ratings, is determined as a percentage of the items applicable to each company. This ensures that 
no company is penalised for failing to disclose items that are not relevant to it. 
The mark plan and actual score achieved by companies are confidential to avoid gamesmanship on the 
part of companies and allow for professional judgment involved in deciding on the applicable mark 
plan sections. Consequently, neither the mark plan nor the actual scores will be published within this 
study. 
Over this study's sample period the total number of marks available rose from 283 in the 2001 survey 
year to 441 in the 2004 survey year. Again, this appears comparable with the AIMR ratings which are 
used by most researchers. These are re-assessed in a similar way on an annual basis (Healy et at., 
1999). Nevertheless, this raises the question of comparability over time. However, the objective 
behind the assessment process does not change. Annual reports were rated according to current 
accounting standards and topical issues. In addition, this study does not draw time-series statistical 
inferences. Consequently, no bias is expected as a result of the change in the E&Y survey's mark plan. 
The variable is calculated as follows in each of the four years: 
Score 
Where: 
(Score1 + SCOl-e2 + Score3 ) 13 
TotMrks - NAMrks 
Score! 
Score2 
Score3 
TotMrks 
Score determined by adjudicator 1 
Score determined by adjudicator 2 
Score determined by adjudicator 3 
Total marks available in terms of mark plan 
(Equation 3) 
NAMrks Marks not applicable to specific company's annual report 
The scores were obtained from the adjudicators of the E&Y survey of Excellence m Corporate 
Reporting. 
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3.5.2.2 Size (Size) 
The relationship between an entity's disclosure and its economic size is possibly the most significant 
Type I research contribution to contemporary literature. Inter alia, it captures the influence of 
resources available to reporting (Buzby, 1975), competitive positions (Owusu-Ansah, 1998), fixed 
reporting component costs (Lang & Lundholm, 1993), legal costs (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Patton & 
Zelenka, 1997), incentives for information-based trades (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991), aggregate 
demand for analyst services (Bhushan, 1989), information availability (Hope, 2003) and levels of 
diversification (Healy et al., 1999; Durn & Reeb, 2002). In addition, some of these effects have been 
shown to hold in the South African context (Crosoer, 2003; Negash, 2001). In order to achieve 
comparability and to avoid erroneously attributing any of the above-mentioned effects to a company's 
disclosure policy, it was decided to include this variable in the models specifying the disclosure policy 
impact on information asymmetry and analyst behaviour. 
Within this study, size is measured in terms of market capitalisation as at the beginning of each 
company's financial year. The choice of proxy for company size is consistent with Botosan (1997, 
2000), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Bushee and Noe (2000), Hail (2001), Healy et al. (1999), Lang 
and Lundholm (1993, 1996), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Lundholm and Myers (2002), Marquardt 
and Wiedman (1998), Negash (2001), Owusu-Ansah (1998), Sengupta (1998) and Wallace et al. 
(1994). The variable is calculated (in each of the four years) as follows: 
Size = NSt * SPt 
Where: 
Number of shares outstanding at time t 
Market share price at time t 
(Equation 4) 
The data was obtained from I-Net using the I-Connect function for direct volume downloads. 
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3.5.2.3 Trading Volume (Vol) 
As mentioned in 3.5.1.2, trading volume represents the extent to which a company's shares are traded 
in the market. Prior literature suggests that this variable exhibits a strong negative correlation with bid-
ask spreads, i.e. as the trading volume of a share increases bid-ask spreads typically diminish (Welker, 
1995). As such, it reprcsents one of the non-information influences on the bid-ask spreads that cause 
some researchers' scepticism towards the bid-ask spread as a valid proxy for information asymmetry 
(Joos, 2000). To avoid an omitted variable bias, the trading volume of a share is included in the bid-
ask spread model. This is consistent with Botosan and Harris (2000), Healy et al. (1999), Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000), Welker (1995). 
For a definition ofthe variable and the data's source, refer to 3.5.1.2. 
3.5.2.4 Return Volatility (RetVol) 
The return volatility measures firms' perceived investment risk (Bushee & Noe, 2000). Although it 
relates to share returns and not companies' ability to generate positive earnings returns it acts similarly 
on investors who are seeking capital gains. Investors will thus demand discounts in compensation for 
trading a share with greater return volatility. As such, it is one of the non-information influences on 
the baseline liquidity as measured per bid-ask spread or trading volume (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; 
Welker, 1995) and should thus be controlled for in order to avoid attributing undue effect to disclosure 
policies or omitted variable bias (Welker, 1995). Return volatility is measured as the standard 
deviation of monthly share returns. As such, it is a single observation and does not require aggregation 
to arrive at an annual figure. The variable is calculated as follows in each of the four years: 
Ret Vol 
Where: 
n-l 
x 
De!,"Tees of freedom 
Observation number i 
Mean of all observations 
(Equation 5) 
The data required to calculate the return volatility used within this study was obtained from I-Net 
using the I-Connect function for direct volume downloads. 
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3.6 Analyst Behaviour 
3.6.1 Dependent Variables 
There are four main features of analyst behaviour examined in contemporary disclosure research. The 
only known researchers to address all four variables comprehensively are Lang and Lundholm (1996). 
Consequently, this study follows their approach in defining the variables used as proxies. 
3.6.1.1 Number of Analysts (#Anlyst) 
This variable is a measure of the analyst attention a particular company receives. More specifically, it 
stands for the number of analysts that make monthly forecasts of annual earnings. Bhushan (1989) 
suggested that the number of analysts is set by the aggregate demand and supply for their services. 
Research consensus demonstrates a positive relationship between disclosure policy and the number of 
analysts, indicating that when information extraction becomes cheaper, more analysts will make 
earnings forecasts (Lang & Lundholm, 1996). The choice of this variable is consistent with Healy et 
al. (1999), Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Rock et al. (2001). Consistent with Lang and Lundholm 
(1996), the average monthly number of analysts is used. This is considered superior to using the yearly 
sum of analysts, as it does not bias against companies with missing data points. The variable for each 
of the four years is calculated as follows: 
#Anlyst = (NAN/ + ... + NAN/+12 )*1112 (Equation 6) 
Where: 
NANt 
NAN(+12 
Number of analysts providing EPS forecasts in month t 
Number of analysts providing EPS forecasts in month t + 12 
Note that, as mentioned above, if no forecasts were provided in any given month, such a month is 
excluded from the average in order to avoid a misstatement of the above variable. 
The data was obtained from the I1B/E/S database via Thomson Financial as a research grant. 
The following hypothesis is tested (stated in its alternative form): 
H3: There is a positive relationship between disclosure policy and a company's analyst following. 
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3.6.1.2 Forecast Dispersion (ForDisp) 
The forecast dispersion is a measure of the range of forecasts or, alternatively, the disagreement 
between different analysts. Although not conclusively researched, consensus indicates that analysts 
use substantially the same model and place less emphasis on private information as more information 
is made public (Healy et at., 1999; Lang & Lundholm, 1996). This implies a negative relationship 
between disclosure policy and forecast dispersion. The degree of forecast dispersion is measured as 
the inter-analyst standard deviation, which is deflated by share price to achieve comparability (Lang & 
Lundholm, 1996). In order to obtain an annual aggregate, the median over the twelve months is 
calculated. This aggregate is less sensitive to outliers and thus considered more appropriate. The 
variable is calculated as follows in each of the four years: 
I I n 
./ L(x; 
V n 1 i~1 ForDisp == -'-------
Sp, 
Where: 
n - 1 
x 
Degrees of freedom 
Observation number i 
Mean of all observations 
Stock price at time t 
(Equation 7) 
The data was obtained from the IIB/E/S database via Thomson Financial as a research grant. 
The following hypothesis is tested (stated in its alternative form): 
H4: There is a negative relationship between disclosure policy and the standard deviation of analyst 
forecasts. 
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3.6.1.3 Forecast Accuracy (ForAee) 
Forecast accuracy is a factor of the extent to which a company reports information relevant to future 
earnings and therefore gauges the amount of pre-disclosure information available to investors. As 
more information is made public, earnings forecasts should become more accurate (Lang & 
Lundholm, 1996) by reducing uncertainties relating to both economic affairs and the accounting 
alternatives used by firms (Hope, 2003). The choice of this variable is consistent with Durn and Reeb 
(2002), Hope (2003), Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Marquardt and Wiedman (1998). 
The definition of the variable used within this study follows Lang and Lundholm (1996) and 
Marquardt and Wiedman (1998) as the negative of the absolute value of the analyst forecast error, 
which is deflated by share price. The variable is expressed as a negative to make the least accurate 
forecast the smallest number. This allows testing for a positive association between disclosure and 
analyst forecasts. The accuracy is measured in the last month of companies' financial year, which is 
when information asymmetry should be lowest. In addition, using the last month's forecast maximises 
the chance that JSE Share Exchange News Service (SENS) announcements have been incorporated by 
analysts. As it is a yearly observation, no aggregation is required. In each of the four years, the 
variable is calculated as follows: 
- (IEPSI AFtl) For Ace = -'---------'-
SPt 
Where: 
Earnings per share at time t 
M:edian analyst forecast at time t 
Stock price at time t 
(Equation 8) 
The components necessary to calculate this variable were obtained from the VB/E/S database via 
Thomson Financial as a research grant. 
The following hypothesis is tested (stated in its alternative form): 
H5: There is a positive relationship between disclosure policy and the accuracy of analyst forecasts. 
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3.6.1.4 Revision Volatility (RevVol) 
This variable is an indicator of the smoothness with which analysts revise their earnings forecasts. The 
volatility of revisions should decrease as the amount of earnings relevant infonnation rises. The only 
known researchers to address this issue are Lang and Lundholm (1996). Consequently, this paper 
adopts their definition of revision volatility as the standard deviation of the changes over the fiscal 
year in the median forecast from the preceding month. It is deflated by the share price at the beginning 
of the financial year (Lang & Lundholm, 1996). As such, it is an annual observation and does not 
require aggregation. The variable is calculated as follows: 
1 n 
-I(Xi X)2 
n 1 i~l RevVol = -------
S~ 
Where: 
n 1 
x 
(Equation 9) 
Degrees of freedom 
Observation number i : (median forecastt - median forecastt_l) 
Mean of all observations 
Stock price at time t 
The components necessary to calculate this variable were obtained from the VB/E/S database via 
Thomson Financial as a research grant. The share price is obtained from I-Net. 
The following hypothesis is tested (stated in its alternative fonn): 
H6: There is a negative relationship between disclosure policy and the volatility of analysts' forecast 
revIsIOns. 
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3.6.2 Independent Variables 
This section presents a description of each independent variable, explains its derivation and how the 
necessary data was collected. 
3.6.2.1 Disclosure Score (Score) 
A full discussion of this variable is provided under section 3.5.2.1. 
3.6.2.2 Size (Size) 
A full discussion ofthis variable is provided under section 3.5.2.2. 
A size effect specific to analyst behaviour was documentcd by Healy et al. (1999), who noted that 
larger companies typically provide more information to analysts and have more diversified 
investments. They found that this makes their performance more predictable and increases analyst 
consensus. Rock et al. (2001) confirmed this and added that size may be a more important determinant 
of analyst following than was previously reported. In order to avoid attributing these effects to 
companies' disclosure policies, it was decided to integrate this variable in the analyst behaviour 
models. 
For an explanation of how the variable is calculated and how it was obtained, refer to section 3.5.2.2. 
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3.6.2.3 Historic Standard Deviation of Return on Equity (HSDROE) 
The historic standard deviation of returns on equity (ROE) measures the complexity of the forecasting 
task faced by analysts. The more volatile company returns, the harder it becomes to predict future 
earnings. This is likely to influence the number of analysts, their accuracy, revisions volatility and the 
disagreement amongst them (Durn & Reeb, 2002). In addition, it affects analysts' incentive to gather 
information about the company (Lang & Lundholm, 1996). Therefore, this variable accounts for non-
information related influence on analyst behaviour and thus needs to be controlled for. The variable 
has previously been used by Durn and Reeb (2002), Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Zhang (2001). It 
is determined over the preceding ten years. As this variable is a yearly observation, no aggregation is 
necessary. 
ROE is a measure of performance, which is considered superior to earnings per share (EPS) or 
revenue growth because it incorporates capital investment. However, it is not a good indicator of value 
creation, which is achieved only if returns are in excess of the cost of capital (Miller, 2003). Despite 
the fact that ROE does not demonstrate this, it is still widely used and therefore considered appropriate 
for the purpose of this study. In all four years, the variable is calculated as follows: 
Where: 
n 
x 
ROE = NPATSH 
OSC 
Where: 
NPATSH 
OSC 
Degrees of freedom 
Observation number i: ROE (Equation 11) 
Mean of all observations 
Net profit attributable to ordinary shareholders 
Ordinary share capital 
(Equation 10) 
(Equation 11) 
The data used to calculate this variable was obtained using McGregors' Blink function for direct 
volume downloads. 
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3.6.2.4 Return-Earnings Correlation (R-ECorr) 
This variable measures the relationship between earnings and share returns and, similarly to the 
historic standard deviation of ROE explained above, it is an indicator of the forecasting complexity. 
Zhang (2001) argues that a higher correlation would imply a lower cost of information production as 
the share return captures significant portions of future earnings. It has previously been employed by 
Lang and Lundholm (1993, 1996) and Zhang (2001). The choice of ROE was made to ensure 
comparability. The correlation is measured over the preceding ten years. As it is a yearly observation, 
aggregation is not necessary. The definition of this variable is adopted from Lang and Lundholm 
(1996). This variable is calculated as follows for each of the four years: 
R-ECorr 
Where: 
x 
I (Xi X)(Yi - y) 
= ShareReturn at time 1 (see Equation 13) 
Mean of all observations: ShareReturn 
ROE at time 1 (see Equation 11) 
Y Mean of an observations: ROE 
(Equation] 2) 
SP! SP!-1 ShareReturn = (Equation 13) 
SP! 1 
Where: 
Stoek price at time t 
Stock price at time t-l 
The data used to calculate this variable was obtained using McGregors' Blink function for direct 
volume downloads. 
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3.6.2.5 Earnings Surprise (EarnSurp) 
This variable controls for the magnitude of the unforeseen earnings information affecting the earnings 
forecasts. In other words, this variable explains the unexpected and unpredictable portion of the 
earnings announcement. It is included to remove the non-disclosure related effects from the analysis. 
Following Lang and Lundholm (1996) who introduced this variable, it is only included in the models 
measuring the impact of disclosure on forecast characteristics, not the number of analysts. This study 
adopts the definition used by Lang and Lundholm (1996). It is deflated by the share price to achieve 
comparability. As an annual figure, it does not require aggregation. The variable is calculated as 
follows for each year: 
EarnSurp 
IEPSt EPS, 11 
SPt I 
Where: 
EPS, Earnings per share at time t 
EPSt-1 Earnings per share at time t-l 
SPt-1 Stock price at time t-l 
3.6.2.6 Number of Analysts (#Anlyst) 
(Equation 14) 
In addition to being a dependent variable the number of analysts is also employed as explanatory 
variable. It is a measure of the information asymmetry in which forecasts are made and functions as an 
indicator of peer pressure amongst analysts (Hope, 2003). Hope (2003) acknowledged that from a 
theoretical point of view, it is not obvious whether disclosure and the number of analysts are 
substitutes or complements for each other. Durn and Reeb (2002) noted that the number of analysts is 
a measure of forecasting complexity. The use of this control variable is adopted from Hope (2003), 
Durn and Reeb (2002) and Rock et al. (2001). This variable is only included in the three models 
studying the disclosure policy effect on forecast dispersion, accuracy and revision volatility as it may 
not be regressed upon itself. 
For an explanation of the variable's calculation and for the source of the data, refer to section 3.6.1.1. 
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3.7 Variables Not Selected 
3.7.1 Percentage new Forecasts 
This variable, as suggested by Lang and Lundholm (1996: 478), addresses potentially "stale" or non-
revised estimates. Controlling for the effect of new forecasts reduces any systematic variation across 
observations due solely to differences in the proportion of recently revised forecasts. However, further 
tests by Lang and Lundholm (1996) suggest that "staleness" is not a problem and that tests including 
and excluding the variable are consistent. Subsequent researchers do not appear to employ a similar 
factor. Lastly, the data obtained from IIB/E/S is not comprehensive enough to calculate the variable 
according to the definition used by Lang and Lundholm (1996). As a result, it was considered 
impractical to include the factor within this study. 
3.7.2 Issue of EguitylDebt 
The desire to issue equity or debt instruments to the public has been identified by several researchers 
as a strong motive for management to review their disclosure policies (Botosan & Harris, 2000; Healy 
et al., 1999; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Lang & Lundholm, 1993, 2000). Subsequently, a variety of 
researchers used a control variable to adjust their models for companies' capital market activity. 
Amongst them are Botosan and Harris (2000), Marquardt and Wiedman (1998), Welker (1995) and 
Bushee and Noe (2000). 
[n order to replicate the same approach within this study, both the Bond Exchange of South Africa 
(Bondex) and the JSE were approached for the data necessary to determine this variable. Whereas the 
Bondex was able to supply data in a suitable format, the database maintained at the JSE was unable to 
supply a list of companies that issued shares to the public over the sample period in sufficient detail. 
Data maintained at the JSE does not distinguish between different types of share issues. As it is 
important to focus on share issues for value to the public, using the data obtained from the JSE was 
impractical. Consequently, this variable had to be excluded from the analysis in this study. As Negash 
(2001) was the only researcher of the bid-ask spread to include this variable in his analysis (refer to 
Table 2 in section 2.4.3.4), this should not pose a serious limitation. 
The next section introduces the statistical analyses used to test the sample for the research objectives 
and subsequent hypotheses based thereon. 
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3.8 Statistical Analyses 
3.8.1 Overview 
This section discusses the methods of statistical analyses applied to the data. This study is conducted 
cross-sectionally as opposed to taking a time-series approach, as not enough data points are available24 
to follow the latter approach. However, this is a common approach as the reporting of accounting 
information within an annual report does not occur over time but at a single point (Botosan, 1997, 
2000; Botosan & Harris, 2000; Hail, 2001; Hope, 2003; Lang & Lundholm, 1993, 1996, 2000; 
Marquardt & Wiedman, 1998; Welker, 1995). Suitability tests of the proposed vehicle of statistical 
analysis, multiple regression, yield that the data requires transformation in order to perform a 
methodology known as Rank Regression. This analysis is performed repeatedly for each year under 
consideration, namely the survey years 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004. The results of these tests are 
presented and discussed in Chapter 4. 
3.8.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Standard descriptive statistics are applied to the four sample years to explore the data. Again, the 
results are produced in Chapter 4. This data exploration includes an analysis of Pearsons correlations 
among the variables. 
3.8.3 Regression Model 
3.8.3.1 Test for Normality & Constant Variances 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis relies on two important assumptions. 
Firstly, the variables' error term I.:: is assumed to be normally distributed. Since the dependent variable 
(y) is a linear function of I.:: and since Uj are constants, y should also be normally distributed (van den 
Honert, 1999). 
Secondly, the residuals are assumed to have constant variances. 
If either of these two assumptions is violated, OLS regression analysis cannot be performed without 
prior transformation of the affected variables. 
24 A time-series approaeh would necessitate at least 30 years (van den Honert, 1999) of disclosure ratings. 
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Accounting data typically does not satisfy these requirements, making the application of OLS 
regression analysis on such data suspicious (Cooke, 1998). To assess the normality of variables 
suggested within this study, the following hypothesis is tested on the dependent variables using the 
Shapiro-Wilk and Lilliefors tests of normality (in its alternative form): 
H7: The data is not normally distributed. 
The results shown in Appendix B confirm Cooke's assumptions (1998) and show that, with the 
exception of the number of analysts in 2003 and 2004, the null hypothesis of a normal distribution can 
be rejected at conservative levels of significance for all dependent variables. Although these tests are 
not conclusive, they hint strongly at the non-normality of the error term. The fact that the Shapiro-
Wilk test, a more conservative test of normality than the Lilliefors test (Derksen & Keselman, 1992), 
rejects the null hypothesis for the number of analysts in 2003 and 2004 supports the claim of non-
normally distributed error terms. To confirm this, it is necessary to estimate a regression and test the 
error term for normality. This was done for the number of analysts for the 2003 and 2004 years. The 
results, presented in Appendix C, indicate that the error terms for both the 2003 (p = 0.0005) and 2004 
(p 0.0032) number of analyst regressions are not normally distributed. 
In addition, Appendix C presents the test of the constant variances (CJI & C. IV). For both years, the 
residuals appear relatively evenly spread out, although not entirely randomly and thus allow for the 
conclusion of a constant variance. 
However, as the normality assumption is not met for the two variables that appeared to have the 
greatest possibility of a normal error term, it is concluded that the dataset is unsuitable for regression 
analysis. This finding is consistent with Lang and Lundholm (1996), who researched comparable 
variables. 
As a result of these findings, OLS regression analysis cannot be performed. The following section 
introduces an alternative regression analysis, as stipulated by a prior researcher of disclosure. 
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3.8.3.2 Rank Regressions 
In the case of non-normal data, Cooke (1998) suggests a methodology called Rank Regression, which 
involves transforming all variables into ranks from smallest to largest and performing regression 
analysis on the ranks. As this method is distribution-free, the data does need not be normally 
distributed. Moreover, Cooke (1998) notes that Rank Regression is insensitive to outliers and that it 
can be used where the relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables is unknown or 
non-linear. However, as this method transforms all data into ranks, it may be difficult to interpret the 
regression coefficients u. In addition, the data becomes ordinal rather than interval and, therefore, the 
tests are effectively non-parametric and as such weaker than parametric tests (Cooke, 1998). 
Nevertheless, this method has been previously used by Lang and Lundholm (1993, 1996), Owusu-
Ansah (1998) and Wallace et al. (1994). 
Accordingly, the data was ranked using the sequential ranking function of Statistica 6.0, a statistical 
softwarc package. This function was selected as it ranks tied values sequential1y and does not allocate 
tied values the same rank (Miller, 2003). Following this transformation into ranks, multiple regression 
analysis was performed on the data. The results are reported in Chapter 4. 
In this process, the estimated models are tested for multicollinearity, which exists where independent 
variables are highly correlated with one another (van den Honert, 1999). Multicollinearity is 
undesirable as it causes unreliable p-values and it is therefore preferable to usc variables that are as 
uncorrelated as possible (van den Honert, 1999). This maximises the explanatory power offered by the 
regression model. It can be detected by testing for inflated variance factors using the current sweep 
matrix function offered by Statistica 6.0. In the case of multicollinearity, one of the affected variables 
is excluded from the model, which is subsequently rerun. 
Moreover, no use of stepwise regression is made, as the number of independent variables is relatively 
small and the proposed models are pre-specified in terms of prior research (Derksen & Keselman, 
1992). 
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The following regression models are estimated to test hypotheses HI to H6: 
Modell: Bid-Ask Spread (Spread) 
Spread = Uo + u]Seore + U2Size + U3VO[ + u~etVol + £ (Equation 15) 
Model 2: Trading Volume (Vol) 
Vol Uo + u]Seore + U2Size + u3RetVoi + E (Equation 16) 
Model 3: Number of Analysts (#An(vst) 
#Anlyst = Uo + u,Score + U2Size + u3HSDROE + u~-ECorr + usEarnSurp + £ (Equation 17) 
Model 4: Forecast Dispersion (ForDi!ip) 
ForDisp = Uo + u]Seore -+ U2Size + u3HSDROE + u~-ECorr + u5EarnSurp + u6#Anlyst + £ 
(Equation 18) 
Model 5: Forecast Accuracy (ForAcc) 
ForAee = Uo + a1Seore + a2Size + uy{SDROE -+- u~-ECorr + asEarnSurp + a6#Anlyst + £ 
(Equation 19) 
Model 6: Forecast Revision Volatility (RevVol) 
RevVol = ao + alScore + a2Size + u3HSDROE + attR-ECorr + usEarnSurp + u6#Anlyst + E 
Where: 
Spread 
Vol 
Score 
Size 
Ret Vol 
#Anlyst 
rorDisp 
ForAce 
Rev Vol 
ROE 
HSDROE 
R-ECorr 
EarnSurp 
= 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Trading Volume 
Disclosure Score 
Market Capitalisation 
Return Volatility 
Number of Analysts 
Forecast Dispersion 
Forecast Accuracy 
Revision Volatility 
Return on Equity 
Historic Standard Deviation of ROE 
Return Earnings Correlation 
Earnings Surprise 
(Equation 20) 
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3.9 Limitations 
3.9.1 Annual Report as Proxy for Disclosure Policy 
The success of a study of the disclosure policy effect hinges on the appropriateness of the measure of 
disclosure used. As reported in section 2.2.1, corporate disclosure consists of three general 
components25 . Using the annual report as a measure of the disclosure policy introduces research 
limitations of various dimensions. Firstly, the annual report is a reporting document that is issued at a 
single point in time and should, therefore, naturally be a sub optimal proxy for companies' reporting 
efforts that occur over time. Secondly, a company may not have a consistent disclosure policy across 
all avenues of corporate reporting. In such a case, using the annual report would be misrepresentative 
of companies' real disclosure effort and would structurally flaw the statistical analysis. The latter view 
was confirmed by Botosan (1997). 
In response to the first concern, Lang and Lundholm (1993) found that disclosure policies and thus 
reporting efforts are "sticky" over time. This indicates that using a one-off proxy for a continuous 
effect should not introduce an onerous bias. Similarly, they addressed the second issue and found that 
disclosure ratings across different avenues of reporting are highly correlated. Moreover, studies 
employing annual reports alone26 appear consistent in their findings with studies of all disclosure 
avenues27 . 
Consequently, it seems that employing the annual report as the only proxy is acceptable in 
contemporary research and that it should thus be appropriate for this study. Nevertheless, as this was 
found internationally, a residual chance of a bias as result of the chosen proxy remains for a South 
African based study. 
25 Annual reports, press releases (including interim reports) and investor relations (including analyst communication) 
26 (Botosan, 1997, 2000; Hail, 2001; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Negash, 2001) 
27 (Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Bushee & Noe, 2000; Healy et al,. 1999; Lang & Lundholm, 1993, 1996; Welker, 1995, 
Sengupta, 1998) 
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3.9.2 Large Company Selection Bias 
This study addresses large companies listed on the JSE. As a result, the possibility exists that the 
findings of this investigation are not generally applicable to companies of different sizes. This effect is 
partly reduced by controlling for size but cannot be eliminated entirely. Therefore, in order to establish 
the validity of results, a similar study on smaller companies or a sample of companies with a greater 
variance in size should be conducted. In the South African context, this is limited by the non-existence 
of a survey of smaller companies' disclosure comparable to the one published by E&Y. Consequently, 
the results of this study should be interpreted as applying to large, listed companies. Furthennore, the 
power of statistical analysis is weakened to the extent that this selection bias dampens the variation of 
disclosure policy, relative spreads, trading volume and analyst behaviour. Lang and Lundholm (1996) 
agreed and concluded that disclosure policy is likely to have a grcater impact for small finns than for 
large finns. 
3.9.3 Survivorship Bias 
In the analysis, a number of companies had to be removed from the sample as they have delisted or 
deregistered between the time that the annual surveys were published and this study was conducted. 1-
Net subsequently removes such companies from the database accessible via the I-Connect function for 
direct volume downloads. Although this rcpresents a limitation to the strength of this study'S findings, 
data unavailability and subsequent survivorship bias is a familiar effect across contemporary 
accounting disclosure rcscarch (Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Hail, 2001; Healy et ai., 1999; Lang & 
Lundholm, 2000; Negash, 2001; Sengupta, 1998). It follows that the results of this investigation are 
affected by a certain degree of survivorship bias but remain comparable to those of other researchers. 
Additionally, the lack of contemporary researchers' explicit recognition of this effect possibly 
indicates that it is not perceived as a severe impainnent to research findings. 
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3.10 Summary 
Chapter 3 begins with an introduction of the sample selection process, which is based on an E& Y 
survey. This detennines its sample of 100 companies according to thcir market capitalisation. The 
body of this chapter presents a description of the variables employed within this study. All of them 
were previously confinned in the research that has led to this study'S research objectives. 
Two dependent variables, the relative bid-ask spread and trading volume, are chosen to analyse the 
impact of disclosure policy on infonnation asymmetry. To achieve cross-sectional comparability, 
these variables are expressed as a percentage of share price and market capitalisation respectively. 
Four independent variables are proposed to explain the variation in the observed infonnation 
asymmetry. These compensate for non-infonnation influences such as size and trading volume. Four 
dependent variables, the number of analysts, forecast dispersion, foreeast accuracy and revision 
volatility represent analyst behaviour within this study. Six independent variables28 are employed to 
model the disclosure policy effect on the observed analyst behaviour. Again, variables such as size and 
the return earnings correlation adjust for non-infonnation influences on analysts. 
Thereafter, an explanation of the statistical analyses employed within this study is provided. The data 
is tested for its suitability to the proposed technique of analysis, OLS regression. Tests of nonnality 
are perfonned on the two dependent variables most likely, out of the entire sample, to have a nonnally 
distributed error tenn E. After the null hypothesis of a nonnal distribution is rejected and the data is 
found to be unsuitable to OLS analysis an alternative, Rank Regression as advocated by Cooke (1998), 
is suggested and the necessary adjustments are explained. 
Finally, several limitations affect the investigation. Firstly, company disclosure has been shown to 
consist of at least three categories, annual reports, other published infonnation and direct investor 
relations. This study employs annual reports as proxy for all avenues of reporting. This is consistent 
with prior research but remains an approximation. Secondly, because only large companies are 
analysed, the results should be interpreted as applicable only to large companies. Lastly, a 
survivorship bias exists, as not all data was obtainable. 
The next part of this study, Chapter 4, introduces the results of the statistical tests performed. 
28 These are disclosure score, size, historic standard deviation of ROE, returns-earnings correlation, earnings surprise and 
the number of analysts. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
his chapter presents the findings of the statistical analyses. A data exploratory section introduces the 
sample and reconciles the different sample sizes across the four years. This is followed by a brief 
analysis of the descriptive statistics. To preserve the meaningfulness of this section of the chapter, the 
descriptive statistics are presented for the unranked data. The univariate and multivariate analyses 
following the early sections of the chapter are presented for the data in ranked form to achieve 
consistency. Instead of presenting the results on a year by year basis, it was decided to provide and 
discuss each model individually. This allows for an overview of potential trends over the four years 
under consideration. The findings of each model are contrasted with relevant prior research. 
4.2 Data Exploration 
4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The unavailability of data for certain companies (as discussed in section 3.3) results in skewed sample 
sizes, the smallest of which is the 2001 survey year. No sample companies appear to have delisted or 
deregistered since the 2004 survey. Table 5 shows a reconciliation between the original number of 
sample companies and the actual number of companies that remain in the sample for the purpose of 
the statistical analyses. Despite the reduced sample sizes, enough data points remain to perform 
credible regression analyses. This requires a minimum of 30 observations (van den Honert, 1999). 
Moreover, as it is relatively small, the degree of variation in sample sizes over the four years should 
not impair the comparability of findings presented in this chapter other than to the extent of a potential 
survivorship bias as discussed in section 3.9.3. 
Table 1. Reconciliation of Sample Companies 
· Reason for Data UnavailabilitY! l 2001 2002 ... 2003 . raj .. 2004 .' ;';:;~// 
I 100 100 100 100 
• Companies Delisted/Deregistered (14) (8) (5) -
i Incomplete Data (17) (20) (18) (18) 
I Final Sample Companies 69 72 77 82 
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Table 7 shows more specific descriptive statistics for the 2001 year. Apart from the companies where 
no data was available at all, Table 7 reveals that for some companies one or two data points were 
missing. The R-ECorr variable has the least data points available as it extends back for a period often 
years and not all sample companies were listed over the entire period. To adjust for missing fields, 
Statistica's29 mean substitution function was applied. Regressions were reperformed on the samples 
with eliminated missing fields in order to test the validity of this adjustment. The results of these tests 
were substantially consistent with the original models. However, as the original models achieved 
consistently higher adjusted R2s, it was decided that including sample companies with a limited 
number of missing data points was acceptable. 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics 2001 
VanaN inimum M D~v~ 
65 8.463 8.917 1.5000 12.00 2.65 
63 0.009 0.006 0.0008 0.07 0.01 
Percenta e 62 -0.016 -0.009 -0.0802 0.00 0.02 
Percenta e 62 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.00 0.00 
Size R'OOO 63 9853.313 3759.8 900.39 54947.42 12798.04 
S read Percentage 67 0.015 0.013 0.0023 0.07 0.01 
Vol Percentage 67 0.002 0.001 0.0001 0.01 0.00 
Ret Vol Absolute 67 0.123 0.113 0.0563 0.26 0.04 
HSDROE Absolute 69 0.463 0.072 0.0000 17.20 2.11 
R-ECorr Absolute 55 0.057 0.119 -1.0000 1.00 0.47 
EarnSur ercentage 69 0.000 0.000 -0.0019 0.00 0.00 
Score Percentage 69 0.444 0.424 0.2147 0.73 0.13 
As there is little variation over the 4 years, descriptive statistics for the years 2002 - 2004 are presented in Appendix D. 
An inspection of Table 7 reveals that most figures are relatively small, with the exception of Size. This 
is due to fact that most variables are scaled by share price or market capitalisation to achieve cross-
sectional comparability. With the exception of Size, HSDROE and R-ECorr, it appears that the median 
and means are relatively close together, implying that the overall data is not heavily affected by 
outliers. Interestingly, #Anlyst falls from a mean of 8.5 analysts per company in 2001 to 6.3 in 2004. 
The maximum number of analysts, however, remains relatively stable at 12, which suggests that the 
variation in the #Anlyst sample increased over the four years. Another variable exhibiting large 
variation is Spread. While the variable's standard deviation in 2001 approaches its mean, it is equal or 
greater than its mean in the years 2002-2004. 
29 Statistica 6.0 is the statistical software package used for the purpose of this study. 
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4.2.2 Correlation Matrices 
The correlation matrices are shown separately for the variables specific to information asymmetry and 
analyst behaviour. Table 8 shows the correlation between the four independent variables and the two 
dependent measures of information asymmetry. The variables are correlated in ranked form to achieve 
consistency between the univariate and multivariate analyses. 
Table 8. Correlation Matrices: Information Asymmetry 2001 - 2004 
All correlations significant at 1 % or less are marked with an asterisk (*). 
All correlations significant between 5% and 1 % are marked with a double asterisk (**). 
All correlations significant between 10% and 5% are marked with a triple asterisk (***). 
There are two persistent relationships evident from the above table. Firstly, there is a persistent, highly 
significant negative relationship between Size and Spread over the entire four years. This is evidence 
of a strong correlation30 between the two variables and suggests that larger companies experience 
smaller bid-ask spreads as predicted by prior research (Healy et al., 1999; Negash, 2001; Welker, 
1995). Secondly, Size is significantly negatively correlated with Vol. As Vol is expressed as a 
percentage of market capitalisation, this indicates that a smaller percentage of a large company's total 
issued share capital is traded compared to a smaller company. This appears reasonable in South 
Africa, where significant institutional shareholdings exist and overall shareholding is significantly 
more concentrated than in a market such as the U.S. These two relationships seem to confirm the 
literature on information asymmetry and its non-information influences. 
At a preliminary stage, the above table seems to confirm the choice of Size as a control variable within 
this study. Less obvious is the absence of any consistent pattern between Score and the two dependent 
variables. One explanation might be found in the fact that such a univariate analysis does not take into 
account the effect of the various control variables. 
Table 9 presents the correlation matrices for the variables specific to the models analysing the 
disclosure policy effect on analyst behaviour. 
30 A perfect correlation would approach a value of 1 (van den Honert, 1999). 
71 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
Table 9. Correlation Matrices: Analyst Behaviour 2001 - 2004 
#Anl '$I 
-0.32** 1 
Size 0.55* -0.45* 0.62* -0.29** 
HSDROE -0.14 -0.01 -0.03 -0.16 
R-ECorr -0.02 0.17 -0.02 -0.05 0.09 
EarnSur 0.12 0.11 0.01 -0.05 -0.39* 
Score 0.37* 0.07 -0.2 0.05 0.26** -0.02 
0.55* 0.62* 
-0.05 -0.06 0.03 
R-ECorr -0.07 -0.02 0.17 -0.08 0.04 
EarnSur -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.12 -0.07 
Score 0.22*** -0.01 0.2*** -0.11 0.46* 0.05 
All correlations significant at 1 % or less are marked with an asterisk (*). 
All correlations significant between 5% and 1 % are marked with a double asterisk (**). 
All correlations significant between 10% and 5% are marked with a triple asterisk (***). 
0.04 
0.22*** 
0.03 
-0.16 
0.49* 
0.05 
-0.23** 
-0.25** 
-0.25** 
-0.14 
0.48* 
-0.03 
-0.26** 
-0.01 
0.11 
-0.20 
-0.08 
-0.05 
-0.22** 
0.02 
0.01 
0.29** 
0.15 
Table 9, presenting the correlations between the independent and the dependent variables of the 
analyst behaviour models, reveals two persistent relationships. Size is persistently and highly 
significantly correlated with #Anlyst. Although Size also exhibits correlations with the remaining 
dependent variables, the strength and significance of those relationships fluctuate. Despite this 
observation, Size appears to be the dominant explanatory variable of analyst behaviour on a univariate 
basis. The second association exists between Score and #Anlyst. In this case, a correlation is evident 
even though the significance varies over the time period. EarnSurp shows a highly significant 
correlation with ForAcc in 2002 and 2004, thus supporting its choice as control variable in the ForAcc 
models. The remaining correlations appear to be more haphazard and therefore no further trends are 
apparent based on this univariate analysis. 
The following section presents and discusses the findings of the multivariate analysis, Rank 
Regression, as suggested by Cooke (1998). 
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4.3 Regression Models 
As explained in section 3.8.3, the data's unsuitability to standard OLS regressIOn led to the 
transformation of all variables into ranks. These were subsequently regressed, in ranked format, in 
terms of a method called Rank Regression (Cooke, 1998). This section outlines and discusses the 
results of the various models run for each of the four years. While the primary objective of this section 
is to validate the yeady results in terms of the contemporary research findings introduced in Chapter 2, 
the nature of the analysis requires an examination of whether or not such findings hold over the four 
years. Therefore, the subsequent discussion of results aims to detect both trends apparent from the four 
years of results as well as to integrate the findings with prior research. 
The results for each model, as depicted in section 3.8.3, are examined individually. The analysis 
begins with the findings for the disclosure policy effect on information asymmetry. 
4.3.1 Information Asymmetry 
4.3.1.1 Information Asymmetry - Bid-Ask Spread 
The hypothesis underlying this model is that of a negative relationship between disclosure policy 
(Score) and information asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask spread (Spread). Table 10 presents the 
statistical results of the Rank Regression performed in terms of the model described in section 3.8.3. 
As aforementioned, the model is reperformed for each year under consideration following the cross-
sectional approach outlined in Chapter 3. 
Table 10. Summary Regression Output: Spread 
. Variable i*x ;;2oql.~~.iI' •.... 200~ 2003 '.' 2004 .. . .. 
Score Coefficient -0.182 -0.025 -0.53 -0.59 
P-value (0.043) (0.07) (0.01) (0.087) 
Vol Coefficient -0.071 -0.069 -0.064 -0.052 
P-value (0.431 ) (0.409) (0.335) (0.453) 
Ret Vol Coefficient 0.063 0.114 0.088 0.269 
P-value (0.485) (0.152) (0.223) (0.0005) 
Size Coefficient -0.71 -0.808 -0.876 -0.821 
P-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Std. Error 13.36 13.47 12.49 14.52 
Adj. RL 51.55% 56.78% 68.81 % 62.83% 
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The above model appears to support the hypothesis of a negative relationship between Spread and 
Score. The two variables exhibit a negative relationship in each of the four years under consideration. 
As indicated by Score's coefficient, this relationship becomes stronger over time, with the exception 
of the 2002 financial year. This suggests that disclosure policy increasingly affects companies' bid-ask 
spreads in South Africa and thus that the local capital market increasingly takes note of companies' 
reporting. Furthermore, it indicates that higher levels of disclosure are statistically significantly (1 % -
10% level of significance) associated with less information asymmetry. This was linked to less 
adverse selection (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991), less price-protection (Welker, 1995) and less 
estimation risk (Botosan, 1997). This implies that disclosure policy may be used as an economic 
instrument (Welker, 1998) to adjust the level of information asymmetry. The fact that companies' 
disclosure ratings vary between excellent and perfunctory (refer to section 2.2.4) supports this view 
and suggests that local companies might be managing their disclosure efforts to aehieve acceptable 
levels of information asymmetry. 
In a wider context, the above results hint at a connection between disclosure policy and the cost of 
equity capital, of which information asymmetry is a kcy component (Botosan, 1997, 2000). In the 
South African context, this could entail that companies may be in a position to reduce their cost of 
equity capital by means oftheir disclosure policies. 
These findings agree to conclusions drawn, in different research environments, by Marquardt and 
Wiedman (1998) and Welker (1995). The significance of the above relationship varies between highly 
significant (l %) and significant (10%), which is consistent with international findings. 
However, the scope for comparisons between this study and contemporary literature is limited. Two 
out of three disclosure policy effect studies on the bid-ask spread do not model disclosure policy 
directly. Healy et al. (1999), who documented a 10% level of significance, studied companies that 
exhibited sustained improvements in reporting. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) studied firms that 
switched from the German to an international reporting framework and documented a relationship 
significant at the 5% level. Both research projects emp10yed dummy variables31 as a factor of 
disclosure whereas this study employs direct ratings of disc10sure. The only directly comparable study, 
conducted by We1ker (1995), documented a negative relationship at the 5% level of significance, 
which corresponds to this study. 
31 Healy et al. (1999): I if improved disclosure; 0 if no improvement 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000): I if switched to lAS/U.S. GAAP; 0 if still report under German GAAP 
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Vol and RetVol, two out of the three control variables, behave in the predicted direction. From the 
above table, it appears that the bid-ask spreads over the four years fall with trading volume and rise 
with increasing share return volatility. However, based on the variables' statistical insignificance in 
the above models there is no sufficiently strong evidence of this relationship in the chosen sample and 
the results are therefore only indicative. 
This tinding is in contrast to international research findings. Healy et al. (1999), Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000) and Welker (1995) all determined highly significant relationships at the 1 % level. The only 
other South African researcher on the effect of liquidity on the bid-ask spread, Negash (2001), 
documented a relationship between his modified measure of liquidity and relative bid-ask spreads, 
which was significant at the 10% level. The difference between his findings and those of this study 
may possibly be explained in terms of a sample selection bias. While his study focused on industrial 
companies only, this study comprises the largest 100 JSE listed companies, which include various 
sectors32. In addition, as the size of a company affects its trading volume (see 4.3.1.2) and as all 
sample companies are large, the possibility exists that their base levels of trading volume are too high 
to measure an incremental effect on the bid-ask spread. Hence, a trading volume effect may still hold 
for smaller companies with lower inherent trading volumes. The insignificance of Ret Vol is consistent 
with Welker (1995), the only other known empirical researcher ofthis variable. 
In contrast, Size exhibits the clearest pattern in the model over the four years. It is statistically highly 
significant at the 1 % level in the predicted negative direction and, by reference to its coefficient, has a 
strong relationship over the entire time frame. Thus, the results may be understood to imply that, in 
South Africa as internationally suggested by Healy et al. (1999) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), 
larger companies observe smaller bid-ask spreads. Negash (2001), who used total assets as proxy 
instead of market capitalisation, documented a relationship at the 10% level only. This might signal 
that a company's market capitalisation, which is forward looking, is a more appropriate measure of the 
size effect on the bid-ask spread than the historic total assets figure. 
The adjusted coefficient of multiple determination (R2), which adjusts for the number of explanatory 
variables, shows that the proportion of the variation in Spread explained by the model increases from 
52% in 2001 to 63% in 2004. Negash (2001) achieved an adjusted R2 of 92%. Again, his focus on 
industrial companies might account for the difference. In addition, he also included substantially more 
variables that measured risk inherent in companies. It was therefore expected to achieve a lower 
32 Prominent industries are the mining, banking, retail and industrial ones. 
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adjusted R2 in this study. Healy et al. (1999) documented an adjusted R2 of 28% while Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000) explained 80% of the variation of the observed spread. This divergence may 
indicate that the proportion of variation of bid-ask spreads that can be explained by reference to 
disclosure policy is market specific. Crosoer (2003), in a Type I study of characteristics explaining 
levels of company disclosure in South Africa, concluded that his results were weaker than most 
international findings but consistent with those studies conducted in developing countries. As no 
comparable known study, besides that by Negash (2001), was conducted in a developing country this 
claim cannot be verified for the purpose of this study. A test for inflated variance factors using the 
current sweep matrix function offered by Statistica 6.0 showed no multicollinearity in this model. 
In summary, the above model produces empirical evidence of a negative association between 
disclosure policy and information asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask spread. Consequently, 
disclosure policy also appears to be negatively associated with estimation risk, adverse selection and 
price-protection, which are all hypothesised to be components of the bid-ask spread. This may indicate 
that companies in South Africa manage their disclosure policy to control the amount of information 
asymmetry in the market. As information asymmetry is also a prominent component of the cost of 
equity capital, the above findings may be extended to tentatively suggest a negative relationship 
between disclosure policy and the equity capital cost. This may mean that South African companies 
are in a position to reduce their cost of additional equity finance by means of their disclosure policy. 
Out of the three control variables only size is consistently significant. Only weak evidence of the 
influence of return volatility on the bid-ask spread was found. 
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4.3.1.2 Information Asymmetry - Trading Volume 
This model tests the hypothesis of a negative relationship between disclosure policy and information 
asymmetry as measured by trading volume. The results are shown in Table 11. 
Table 11. Summary Regression Output: Vol 
Variable 2001· 2002 2003 
... "":"' 
Score Coefficient -0.069 -0.057 -0.003 -0.072 
P-value (0.565) (0.611 ) (0.98) (0.565) 
Ret Vol Coefficient 0.057 0.102 -0.009 0.131 
P-value (0.646) (0.379) (0.939) (0.275) 
Size Coefficient -0.314 -0.310 -0.256 -0.137 
P-value (0.031) (0.013) (0.036) (0.252) 
Std. Error 18.43 19.78 21.65 23.85 
Adj. RL 7.79% 6.85% 6.32% 5.52% 
Score exhibits the hypothesised negative direction but, contrary to expectation, is not statistically 
significant in the above model. The model therefore suggests that corporate disclosure policy does not 
influence investors' demand for large South African companies' shares (Diamond & V errec chi a, 
1991). This contradicts Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), the only other known researchers of trading 
volume as a dependent variable representing information asymmetry. 
The reason for this inconsistency may be found in the different samples. While Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000) studied companies reporting under German GAAP and compared those to German 
corporations switching to U.S. GAAP or lAS, this study investigates a sample of companies setting 
their disclosure policy in a homogenous reporting environment. Thus, the scope for disclosure effects 
should be much greater following the research design of Leuz and Verrecchia (2000). A bias might 
also occur as economically successful companies are more likely to switch to another reporting 
framework, which often follows the desire to obtain foreign listings (Hail, 2001). Such companies 
may, due to their double listings and economic success, experience greater trading volumes 
irrespective of their disclosure policy. If uncontrolled for, researchers may subsequently attribute this 
effect to their sample companies' disclosure policy. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) do not test for this 
effect. Inter alia, Hail (2001) addresses this issue when examining the disclosure effect on the cost of 
equity capital in Switzerland. 
77 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
Another possible explanation may be this study's sample selection. This investigation only analyses 
large companies while other researchers investigate spreads of different company sizes (Hail, 2001) or 
specifically look at smaller companies (Lang & Lundholm, 2000). There is a possibility that large JSE 
listed companies' trading volumes are too high to measure an incremental disclosure policy effect as 
suggested in section 3.9.2. Lang and Lundholm (2000: 627) indirectly confirmed this by noting that 
"small companies are more likely to use their disclosure policy to influence market perceptions" while 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) mentioned that the amount of non firm provided information is much 
greater for large companies irrespective of disclosure policy. 
Moreover, the above results appear consistent with Easley et ai. (1996) who found that the probability 
of information based trades declines with trading volume (refer 2.4.3.2). All of this may explain the 
lack of a statistically significant disclosure policy effect in the above model. As a result, the above 
finding is not conclusive evidence of the non-existence of a disclosure policy effect on trading volume 
in South Africa. 
Other researchers of the information asymmetry (Healy et aI., 1999; Welker, 1995) appear to employ 
trading volume as an explanatory variable only to control for the proportion of non-information 
influence on the bid-ask spread. This may possibly be an indicator that, despite a strong theoretical 
link, it is difficult to empirically extract the disclosure policy effect on trading volume. 
Size is statistically significant from 2001 to 2003 between the 1% and 5% level of significance. 
However, contrary to the expected positive sign suggested by literature to date (Botosan, 2000; 
Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Healy et al., 1999; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; 
Welker, 1995), it is significantly negative. This implies that as JSE companies become larger, a 
smaller proportion of their total outstanding share capital is traded. This appears reasonable as 
ownership of JSE listed firms is more concentrated than share ownership in the U.S. market. This is 
part of South Africa's Apartheid legacy. Much of this concentrated investment is not traded actively. 
RetVol is statistically insignificant over the four years with conflicting signs between the years. This 
seems to show that investors' demand for JSE listed shares is relatively insensitive to volatile share 
returns. 
The adjusted coefficients of multiple determination (R2) are below 10% in each of the four years, 
which indicates that the model explains only a small proportion of the variation observed in the 
sample companies' trading volume. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) who researched companies' trading 
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volume using a similarly specified model achieved an adjusted R2 of 34%. When compared to their 
bid-ask spread model33, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) experienced a large drop in the proportion of 
explained variation. In this regard, this study is consistent with prior research. 
In the light of the above findings, the fact that only one known study empirically addresses trading 
volume as a dependent measure of information asymmetry may possibly indicate that, despite its 
popularity as an indicator of information differentials in theory (Joos, 2000), disclosure policy offers 
only limited amounts of explanation. The findings presented in Table 11 appear to support critics' 
claims that there is too much non information influence affecting trading volume for it to be a measure 
of information asymmetry (Joos, 2000; Welker, 1995). No multicollinearity was detected in the above 
model after testing for inflated variances. 
In summary, the fitted model explains statistically insignificant amounts of the observed variation of 
trading volume. Consistent with international research a large decrease in adjusted R2 was experienced 
when compared to the bid-ask spread model. The inconsistency of the above model with literature to 
date may possibly be explained in terms of differences in the research environment and sample 
selection. The fact that disclosure policy offers insignificant explanation regarding trading volume 
supports criticism that trading volume is affected by too many non-information factors to be used as 
measure of information asymmetry in disclosure rclated studies. 
33 Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) achieved an adjusted R2 of 80%. 
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4.3.2 Analvst Behaviour 
4.3.2.1 Analyst Behaviour - Number of Analysts 
This section considers the statistical results relating to the model of the disclosure policy effect on the 
number of analysts following the sample companies. The hypothesis outlined in section 3.6.1.1 
supporting this model is that of a positive relationship between disclosure policy and analyst 
following. 
Table 12. Summary Regression Output: #Anlyst 
y~!~~e i~ "jl!ll!!!~~ ~~J ·~BLi0';~·. 1/"; 20()2 .. 2003 . .. . 2~O4. ;'1. ~~ 
Score Coefficient 0.262 0.272 0.322 0.378 
P-value (0.022) (0.069) (0.021 ) (0.002) 
HSDROE Coefficient -0.062 -0.127 -0.034 -0.057 
P-value (0.521) (0.483 ) (0.715) (0.484) 
R-ECorr Coefficient 0.176 0.089 -0.066 0.001 
P-value (0.208) (0.483) (0.559) (0.99) 
Size Coefficient 0.51 0.592 0.502 0.510 
P-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Std. Error 15.59 16.21 18.46 17.14 
Adj. RL 27.7% 34.74% 36.3% 44.2% 
According to expectation, Score exhibits a positive sign and is statistically significant between the 1 % 
and the 10% level of significance. The strength of the relationship is moderate, but both the strength of 
the relationship and its significance, appear to be increasing on a yearly basis. It thus seems that 
analysts increasingly consider companies' disclosure policy when deciding whether to follow them or 
not. This finding is consistent with Healy et al. (1999) and Lang and Lundholm (1996) who similarly 
documented positive relationships between disclosure policy and analyst following. 
Furthermore, the analysis appears to confirm findings by Lang and Lundholm (1996) who noted that 
disclosure and analysts are not substitutes for each other and that more analysts are likely to follow a 
company that makes sufficient information available. The above results may be understood to imply 
that, given the positive relationship documented, South Afiican analysts rely on company disclosure 
and are attracted to companies that facilitate their information extraction process by means of 
disclosure. This may also indicate that companies have the ability to use their disclosure policy to 
affect the level of analyst attention they receive. This remains a tentative thought as this study does not 
address causality. Simultaneity, mentioned by Welker (1995) with regard to disclosure policy and 
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infonnation asymmetry, may also affect the relationship between disclosure policy and analyst 
following. 
HSDROE, the historic standard deviation of the return on equity, and R-ECorr, the returns-earnings 
correlation, behave in the predicted direction. HSDROE exhibits a negative sign, thus indicating that 
analysts are less likely to follow companies with an erratic earnings history, which complicates the 
forecasting process (Lang & Lundholm, 1996). The relationship is, however, not statistically 
significant. This finding is consistent with Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Marquardt and Wiedman 
(1998) who found negative but insignificant relationships. Healy et at. (1999) and Durn and Reeb 
(2002) documented a weakly significant relationship. 
R-ECorr, as predicted, exhibits a positive sign in three of the four years, which implies that in the 
South African context, analysts are more likely to follow finns where earnings are a good indicator of 
share returns (King et at., 1991). Therefore, the model appears to con finn that analysts tend to follow 
companies that have easily predictable earnings and share prices. The statistical insignificance of the 
variable over the four years, however, means that the above results offer no statistical support for such 
an inference. 
As predicted by literature, Size is the dominant detenninant of the observed analyst following. Its 
coefficient is stable at 0.5 and shows that the relationship between the size and the number of analysts 
following a company is moderate. Statistically, the relationship is highly significant at the 1 % level 
over all four years. This lends support to the fact that analysts are more likely to follow larger 
companies, which is where demand for their services is greater (Bhushan, 1989; Lang & Lundholm, 
1993). Size is also positively associated with infonnation availability that does not stem from 
company disclosure. 
The adjusted R2 increases steadily over the four years and reaches 44% in the 2004 financial year. This 
is a reasonable proportion and is comparable to the 40% achieved by Healy et al. (1999) and the 45% 
detennined by Lang and Lundholm (1996). As opposed to this study, Lang and Lundholm (1996) 
found the annual report to be statistically insignificant when regressing all three categories of 
disclosure separately. This contradiction may indicate that annual reports in South Africa playa more 
important role in detennining the number of analysts than in the u.S. environment. Multicollinearity 
did not occur. 
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In summary, the results of the above model are according to expectation. The two statistically 
insignificant control variables (HSDROE and R-ECorr) have previously been found to be insignificant 
in similar international studies. Both observed disclosure policy and company size are positively 
associated with companies' analyst following and appear reliable. This indicates that, in South Africa, 
companies may be able to influence their analyst following by means of their disclosure policy and 
that analysts are more likely to follow large companies. The goodness of fit (R2) is comparable to 
international studies and supports the soundness of the above model. 
4.3.2.2 Analyst Behaviour - Forecast Dispersion 
This model tests the hypothesis of a negative association between corporate disclosure policy and 
forecast dispersion amongst analysts. Table 13 presents the related statistical results. 
Table 13. Summary Regression Output: ForDisp 
Variable ~., ... :: ~ •• 2002: 2003 ':;. 2004lffi' f,>;:' ,"" 
Score Coefficient -0.150 -0.036 -0.062 -0.074 
P-value (0.323) (0.72) (0.535) (0.51 ) 
HSDROE Coefficient -0.65 -0.071 0.171 0.016 
P-value (0.537) (0.493) (0.086) (0.881 ) 
, R-ECorr Coefficient 0.177 -0.0008 -0.058 -0.042 
P-value (0.250) (0.995) (0.617) (0.716) 
EarnSurp Coefficient 0.079 -0.351 -0.04 -0.098 
P-value (0.469) (0.001 ) (0.681 ) (0.374) 
, Size Coefficient -0.227 -0.287 -0.389 -0.117 
P-value (0.089) (0.013) (0.000) (0.313) 
Std. Error 17.053 17.85 19.06 22.408 
Adj. RL 2.75% 17.31 % 14.81% 3.34% 
As hypothesised, Score shows a negative sign, which indicates that the forecast dispersion diminishes 
with improvements of corporate disclosure. Adopting the terminology of Lang and Lundholm (1996), 
a negative association suggests that analysts use the same forecasting model and observe the same 
firm-provided information but hold different amounts of private information. This privately held 
information, however, tends to become less important as more firm provided information is made 
available. Despite this, the relationship is not statistically significant. This finding is inconsistent with 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) who documented a significant negative relationship. However, the 
researchers studied two regression models. One included an aggregate variable combining all three 
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categories of disclosure while the second considered all three individually. Annual report disclosure 
was not regressed on its own. Although it is unlikely to be the sole cause for the reported 
inconsistency, this moderates the direct comparability of the two studies. 
Moreover, the results stipulate that, in South Africa, the forecast dispersion is driven by factors, which 
are not included in the above model. Additionally, local disclosure policy cannot be associated with 
dispersion in forecasts, which implies that other non-disclosure related factors may be the dominant 
cause. One possible explanation for this would be the research environment. While Lang and 
Lundholm (1996) researched the U.S. market, a large economy often referred to as the driver of the 
world economy, South Africa is a small, open capital market. As such it is affected significantly by 
economic changes in the world economy and crises in other emerging countries. An example of this 
may be the Asian Crisis of 1998. Moreover, the South African economy is much more susceptible to 
changes in economic parameters such as the ZARIUS Dollar exchange rate and commodity prices. 
Another possible explanation is a specification bias affecting Score which is approximated by the 
annual report instead of all three disclosure categories. This limitation was introduced in section 3.9.1 
and is further discussed in section 4.3.2.5. 
HSDROE, R-ECorr and EarnSUlp exhibit erratic behaviour with changing signs, coefficients and 
statistical significance levels. In 2003, HSDROE is nearly significant, indicating that, as expected, 
high earnings volatility increases the dispersion of earnings forecasts. However, as this is only 
statistically reliable once, no trend can be deducted. 
Size appears to be negatively associated with forecast dispersion. However, as with the previous 
variables, the significance levels vary. As this variable is significant in two years and nearly 
significant in one year, the assumption of a persistent negative size influence on analyst forecast 
dispersion seems to be reasonable. This finding confirms Healy et ai. (1999) who proposed that 
earnings forecasts become easier for larger companies due to increased levels of diversification and a 
higher overall level of non company provided information. 
The adjusted R2, between 3% in 2001 and 17% in 2002, confirms the erratic and unreliable impression 
of the model. It also implies that the explanatory factors do not capture a stable influence on forecast 
dispersion and, that in the years with low observed R2, other factors appear to dominate the dispersion 
of analyst forecasts. Multicollinearity occurred between Size and #Anlyst, which indicates that both 
variables explain similar amounts of variation. This led to the exclusion of #Anlyst. 
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In summary, the model of forecast dispersion does not lend itself to concrete conclusions. In South 
Africa, corporate disclosure policy does not appear to influence thc observed forecast dispersion 
amongst analysts. This may be due to South Africa's susceptibility to economic factors such as the 
exchange rate of the Rand and world commodity prices. Company size was found to be a more 
reliable determinant of forecast dispersion. 
4.3.2.3 Analyst Behaviour - Forecast Accuracy 
The hypothesis underlying this model is that corporate disclosure policy is positively associated with 
forecast accuracy. Table 14 shows the results pertaining to this model over the four years. 
Table 14. Summary Regression Output: ForAcc 
'Variable i' Ag~'~11't, .... '200i 2003' ~:: 20'04',;: 
... ... .... 
Score Coefficient -0.245 0.011 I 0.153 0.948 
P-value (0.035) (0.905) (0.156) (0.958) 
I HSDROE Coefficient 0.015 -0.115 -0.049 -0.16 
P-value (0.885) I (0.232) (0.642) (0.10) 
I R-ECorr Coefficient 0.125 -0.086 0.065 -0.214 
P-value (0.40) (0.51) (0.602) (0.044) 
! EarnSurp Coefficient 0.191 0.44 -0.019 0.345 
P-value (0.072) i (0.00) (0.858) (0.001) 
• 
Size Coefficient 0.267 
i 
0.27 i 0.196 0.192 
i P-value (0.019) (0.015) 
I 
(0.082) (0.069) 
• Std. Error 16.71 16.59 ! 20.37 20.35 
I Adj. RL 4.32% 21.97% 2.67% 21.33% 
Contrary to expectation, Score is statistically significant, at the 5% level, only in 2001. In that year, 
the direction is negative and therefore implies that more disclosure makes analyst forecasts less 
accurate. Despite this finding's apparent contradiction of theory and literature, it is similar to the 
negative coefficient for annual report disclosure found by Lang and Lundholm (1996). However, as 
their coefficient was statistically insignificant, the researchers did not offer an explanation. As Score is 
statistically significantly negative only in 2001 and since the adjusted R2 only amounts to 4%, this 
finding should not be considered as conclusive. For these reasons, it appears more prudent to dismiss 
the 2001 finding. 
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Overall, the model's lack of statistically significant findings for the above hypothesis indicates that 
disclosure policy as measured by annual reports does not contribute to the accuracy of forecasts. This 
may be due to the fact that annual reports are issued at a single point in time and well ahead of the 
next forecasted earnings figure. This limitation was introduced in section 3.9.1 and is further discussed 
in section 4.3.2.5. It follows that under the given circumstances, more timely fonns of disclosure such 
as interim reports and direct investor relations appear to be more important to the accuracy of analysts' 
forecasts. This conclusion was previously drawn by Lang and Lundholm (1996). In addition, the 
above results suggest that, for the purpose of analyst forecast accuracy, the annual report may not be 
appropriate as a proxy for disclosure policy. This is a speculative statement made in the absence of 
more testing, which would be necessary to validate such an assumption. It is, therefore, only 
considered to be a possible explanation. 
As with the previous models, Size appears as the most reliable detenninant of the observed analyst 
forecast accuracy and is statistically significant between 5% and 10%. As suggested by Healy et al. 
1999, Size exhibits a positive sign, which implies that analysts offer more accurate forecasts for larger 
companies and that it becomes easier to predict earnings for larger companies. The main explanations 
offered are higher levels of diversification (Healy et al.. 1999) and greater overall infonnation 
availability in the environment in which analysts publish forecasts (Hope, 2003). 
EarnSurp is positively statistically significant between 1 % and 10% in three years. This implies, as 
suggested by Lang and Lundholm (1996), that earnings forecast accuracies are influenced by 
unexpected earnings swings and that controlling for this helps to avoid erroneous conclusions. The 
variation in the significance does not allow for a definite conclusion as to the paramcter's effect. 
HSDROE exhibits a negative sign in the last three years under consideration, indicating that analyst 
forecast are less accurate where earnings are historically volatile. This finding is consistent with 
predictions made by Lang and Lundholm (1996) but, because the relationship is only nearly 
significant at the 10% level in 2004, it cannot be regarded as solid empirical evidence. R -ECorr 
displays erratic behaviour in the four individual regression models and, hence, does not lend itself to 
meaningful analysis. The results produced above regarding HSDROE and R-ECorr confonn to those 
reported by Lang and Lundholm (1996). 
Multicollinearity was detected between Size and #Anlyst. Consequently, #Anlyst was removed from 
the regressions. The adjusted R2 fluctuates over the years. In 2001 and 2003, the model explains only 
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small amounts of variation whereas in 2002 and 2004 it explains 22% and 21 % respectively. In the 
more significant years, Size and EarnSurp appear to account for the explanatory power of the model. 
In summary, the above model allows some insight into the accuracy of South African analyst 
forecasts. The statistical insignificance of the proxy for disclosure policy is possibly due to a 
specification bias discussed in Chapter 3. The above results are largely consistent with prior research 
and suggest that, in South Africa, more timely forms of disclosure play more important roles in the 
determination of analysts' forecast accuracy. Company size and earnings surprises appear to influence 
local forecast accuracy in the predicted manner. The strong variation observed in R2 over the four 
years, however, moderates the reliability of these findings. 
4.3.2.4 Analyst Behaviour Revision Volatility 
The final model of analyst behaviour aims to test the hypothesis of a negative relationship between 
disclosure policy and the volatility of earnings forecast revisions. Table 15 presents the statistical 
results. 
Table 15. Summary Regression Output: RevVol 
Vari8:ble ....:,;;;~\ ~·····(r·IJ';:20(}2 ........... : •.... 2003 {;2004,. 
Score Coefficient 0.l38 -0.027 I -0.097 i -0.266 I 
P-value (0.205) (0.786) (0.367) (0.01) 
I HSDROE Coefficient -0.044 0.015 0.141 0.038 . ~ I R-ECorr P-value (0.654) (0.886) (0.185) I Coefficient -0.071 0.049 0.160 
I 
-0.001 • 
P-value (0.614) (0.727) (0.203) (0.71 ) i 
EarnSwp Coefficient -0.007 -0.15 -0.021 
I 
0.241 I 
P-value (0.942) (0.148) (0.202) I (0.023) 
Size Coefficient -0.484 -0.28 -0.142 -0.246 
P-value (0.000) (0.015) (0.207) (0.026) 
. Std. Error 15.79 17.8 20.49 21.11 
Adj. RL 15.78% 6.06% 2.5% 12.14% 
In theory, more information should facilitate smoother revisions (Lang & Lundholm, 1996). 
Accordingly, the key variable Score shows a negative sign in the last three years under consideration. 
This hints at the existence of the hypothesised relationship in the South African capital market. 
However, as Score is statistically significant at the 1 % level only in 2004, the empirical evidence does 
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not appear sufficient to support this case conclusively. As with forecast accuracy, the findings are 
consistent with Lang and Lundholm (1996) as the annual report did not show a significant relationship 
with the revision volatility. It thus appears that, locally, more timely forms of disclosure, such as direct 
investor relations are more important to the volatility of forecast revision. As this explanation was not 
tested empirically, it should be considered as tentative evidence only. Again, the cause of the 
statistically insignificant finding seems to be due to the specification of the annual report as the proxy 
for disclosure policy. This is explained in section 3.9.1 and further discussed in section 4.3.2.5. 
The most dominating explanatory variable is Size with a negative sign. This agrees with the results 
reported by Lang and Lundholm (1996) and suggests that in South Africa, forecast revisions are 
smoother for large companies. It also confirms Healy et ai. (1999) who noted that due to higher 
diversification and overall information availability, earnings prediction becomes easier with size. 
HSDROE and R-ECorr appear erratic with inconsistent signs over the four years and both variables 
are statistically insignificant over all four years. This is partly consistent with Lang and Lundholm 
(1996) who found HSDROE to be highly significant while R-ECorr was reported as insignificant. A 
possible explanation for the insignificant finding regarding HSDROE could be the fact that a yearly 
figure may not be an appropriate explanatory variable for a monthly observation. However, this is 
contradicted by the highly significant (1 % lcvel) relationship documented by Lang and Lundholm 
(1996). Overall, the findings reported in Table 15 might indicate that in the South African context 
other variables that were not tested explain the volatility of forecast revisions more conclusively. The 
low and fluctuating adjusted R2 supports this view. Multicollinearity between #Aniyst and Size led to 
the elimination ofthe former variable from the mode1. 
In short, the model investigating the volatility of forecast revisions appears to be an imperfect fit. The 
amount of variation explained over the fours years fluctuates considerably and is small in two of the 
four years. Although there is some evidence of the hypothesised negative relationship between 
disclosure policy and the revision volatility, it is not observed persistently and is thus not conclusive 
without further testing. This finding is consistent with prior literature. As the proxy for disclosure 
policy is only the annual report, this may be attributed to a specification bias introduced in Chapter 3. 
Company size is shown to be an important determinant and revisions become less volatile for larger 
firms. 
In the light of the above findings, the following section examines the validity of the annual report as a 
measure of overall disclosure policy in more detail. 
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4.3.2.5 Annual Reports as Disclosure Policy Proxy in Analyst Behaviour Research 
Apart from the results produced by the model on #Anlyst, the above findings on the analyses of the 
disclosure policy effect on analyst behaviour are statistically weak. Short of concluding that the 
hypothesised effects do not exist in the local market, this calls into question the specification of the 
respective models. As the control variables have all been pre-specified by previous researchers, this 
leaves the appropriateness of the measure of companies' disclosure policy, Score, to be queried. 
In the light of the above notion, this section discusses the appropriateness of the annual report as the 
proxy for companies' disclosure policies. 
In section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2, it was found that the three categories of disclosure are highly correlated 
with one another (Lang & Lundholm, 1993) and that the annual report is a good proxy for companies' 
overall propensity to report to stakeholders via other avenues of corporate reporting (Botosan 2000). 
It is accepted practice to use the annual report as a measure of disclosure policy (Botosan, 1997, 2000; 
Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000) and, therefore, this approach was followed within this study_ As reported in 
section 4.3.1, this produces results that are broadly comparable with similar studies. However, in the 
field of analyst behaviour, the findings of this study appear weaker than those reported internationally_ 
Although this applies to the main independent variables and control variables and is likely to have 
more than one cause, it questions the approach taken to measure disclosure policy. 
This is emphasised by the findings produced by Lang and Lundholm (1996) who estimated every 
model twice. Their first model was run with an aggregate disclosure variable, which is a weighted 
factor of all three disclosure categories. The second model was run with all three categories as 
individual explanatory variables. If the annual report was an acceptable proxy for the overall 
disclosure policy, the annual report category should yield the same findings as the aggregate variable 
both in the study conducted by Lang and Lundholm (1996) and this report. However, this was not the 
case. 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) documented that the different individual categories of disclosure were 
statistically significant only in some models, while the overall variable was statistically significant in 
all of their models. The findings produced within this report show that, in the South African context, 
the proxy for disclosure policy is only consistently significant in the predicted direction in the first 
model on the number of analysts. This raises the possibility that for the purpose of the analysis of 
analyst behaviour, Score should be interpreted as a factor of companies' annual report disclosure 
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policy as opposed to their reporting effort across all three categories of disclosure. To test for the 
validity of this concern, however, was impractical as a result of the unavailability of objective ratings 
of the sample companies' disclosure policy in terms of their other published information and investor 
relations. 
In summary, this section attempts a cautious approach to understand the differences in the R2,s 
documented between this study and international research. One possible explanation is found in the 
validity of the disclosure policy proxy chosen within this study. The results of this study appear to 
indicate that the annual report as a measure of disclosure policy is inappropriate for the purpose of 
analyst behaviour research. This section thus presents an alternative interpretation of the findings on 
analyst behaviour and argues that Score should be considered a measure of annual reporting only. 
Under this assumption, the results produced here appear more consistent with prior literature. 
4.4 Summary - Research Findings 
The findings presented in Chapter 4 are based on the methodology set out in Chapter 3, namely Rank 
Regression as proposed by Cooke (1998). This was adopted to deal with the data's unsuitability to 
OLS regression analyses. Overall, the results of the univariate analyses were confirmed in the 
multivariate analyses performed. 
According to this study's results, South African companies with high levels of disclosure are 
associated with lower levels of information asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask spread. This 
confirms contemporary literature, which increasingly views corporate disclosure as an economic 
decision with cost and benefits attached to it rather than as an exogenous consequence of external and 
internal factors. It suggests that South African companies adjust their disclosure policies to achieve a 
desired level of information asymmetry. Moreover, this adds to the literature on companies' cost of 
capital. Information asymmetry is identified to be a dominant factor thereof, embodying itself in 
illiquidity and transaction costs as a result of adverse selection, estimation risk and price protection. 
Assuming that lower bid-ask spreads are associated with lower transaction costs and higher liquidity, 
as suggested by prior research, the findings of this study advocate, indirectly, a negative association 
between disclosure policy and companies' cost of capitaL 
The model studying trading volume as a measure of information asymmetry does not confirm this and 
no disclosure policy effect on South African companies' trading volume could be identified. Two 
plausible explanations exist. The first is popular criticism of the trading volume as being too highly 
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influenced by non-information events to be used as a measure of information asymmetry. Indirectly 
this is supported by the fact that only a small number of researchers studied this variable empirically 
but a large number of researchers mentioned the theoretical disclosure policy effect. This would 
promote the conclusion that there is no local disclosure policy effect on the trading volume. 
The second, and more subtle, explanation is found in the sample selection process. In contrast to 
international research, this study focuses only on large companies as a result of the unavailability of 
disclosure ratings for a more diverse sample. This reduces the amount of variation in observed 
disclosure levels and increases the base trading volumes making it more challenging to document 
incremental disclosure policy effects. 
In addition to the above findings, company size was identified as a reliable factor of both bid-ask 
spreads and trading volume. As predicted, larger companies experience smaller bid-ask spreads and 
higher trading volumes. This trend continues into the analyses of analyst behaviour. 
The association between disclosure policy and analyst behaviour in South Africa is less clear, although 
largely consistent with prior literature in this field. Companies with higher levels of disclosure 
experience larger numbers of analysts following their operations. This indicates that South African 
companies may indeed utilise their disclosure policies to affect the analyst attention they receive. 
However, in contrast to prior findings, no such trend could be documented for dispersion of forecasts, 
their accuracy and volatility of earnings forecast revisions. 
The specification of the measure of disclosure policy was identified as a possible cause. Although 
using the annual report as a proxy for companies' disclosure policy is internationally accepted, no 
clear results were documented within this study. Indeed, the results were more consistent with 
international researchers' models employing the annual report in its own name. As a result, an analysis 
assuming the disclosure variable represented annual reports only was attempted. This showed that 
forecast dispersion, forecast accuracy and revision volatility may be affected by more timely means of 
disclosure. This presumption could not be empirically tested as a result of data unavailability. 
The following part, Chapter 5, concludes this study and presents areas for future research. 
90 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the research study of the disclosure policy effect on infonnation asymmetry 
and analyst behaviour. It revisits the objectives of this study and offers explanations for its findings. 
Finally, suggestions for future research are made. 
5.2 The Research Study - Information Asymmetry 
Infonnation asymmetry exists where market participants hold different amounts of value-relevant 
infonnation regarding a company's share. Such infonnation differentials arise between the 
management of a company and its investors and among investors themselves. The consequences of 
both types of infonnation asymmetry are price-protection as investors require compensation in the 
face of adverse selection, the risk of trading with potentially better infonned investors, and estimation 
risk, as investors lack necessary infonnation to make accurate forecasts of a company's future returns. 
These result in illiquidity. The infonnation asymmetry giving rise to such illiquidity has been 
identified as a sib1flificant component of a company's cost of capital. 
International research has shown that corporate disclosure policy is negatively associated with the 
observed levels of infonnation asymmetry. Therefore, disclosure policy should also exhibit an indirect 
negative relationship with companies' cost of capital, which is confinned by direct research on the 
disclosure policy effect on the cost of capital. Although international research evidence appears to be 
conclusive regarding the disclosure policy effect on infonnation asymmetry, researchers occasionally 
differ with regard to their choice of proxies for infonnation asymmetry. 
Prior to this study, only limited research on the disclosure policy effect on infonnation asymmetry had 
been conducted in South Africa. Hence, the objective of this study was to use two proxies of 
infonnation asymmetry that, in theory, are closely linked to infonnation availability and test whether a 
disclosure policy effect can be established. More specifically, the research objectives were to test for 
the existence of a negative association between disclosure policy and the bid-ask spread and a positive 
one with the trading volume of the sample companies. 
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To achieve these objectives, the largest 100 JSE listed companies on 31 October 2000 to 31 October 
2003 were selected as sample. Their observed levels of bid-ask spreads and trading volumes were 
regressed against disclosure policy plus three additional control variables representing company size, 
share return volatility and the level of trading volume. This methodology was previously used by 
Healy et al. (1999), Botosan and Harris (2000), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Negash (2001) and 
Welker (1995). While bid-ask spreads and trading volumes are readily available data, a measure of 
companies' disclosure policy is not publicly available. To overcome this issue, the research sample 
was adopted from the E& Y survey of Excellence in Corporate Reporting in terms of which the annual 
reports of the 100 largest JSE listed companies are rated by three independent adjudicators. Their 
ratings were obtained and employed as a measure of the sample companies' disclosure policies. As the 
ratings are confidential, they were not published within this report. 
The return volatility of the sample companies was computed as the standard deviation of their monthly 
stock returns and is a factor of non-information related uncertainty in the market. Company size was 
measured as the market capitalisation as at 31 October of each year. The inclusion of this variable 
represents a contribution of research knowledge from Type I disclosure research, which established 
that the level of disclosure policy and information asymmetry are affected by company size. Type I 
research found that company size positively affects disclosure policy and negatively affects the level 
of information asymmetry. 
As a result of the data not meeting the assumptions necessary for OLS regression analysis, the data 
was transformed into ranks and regressed in such format in terms of a method called Rank Regression 
by Cooke (1998). 
The results for the more prominent proxy, the bid-ask spread, suggest that a statistically significant 
negative relationship between disclosure policy and information asymmetry holds and that companies 
may be in a position to affect the amount of information asymmetry by altering their disclosure 
policies. Although testing for causality was beyond the scope of this study, the findings further suggest 
that disclosure policy may affect price protection and adverse selection as well as the transaction costs. 
As such, South African companies may be in a position to increase their share liquidity and lower their 
estimation risk. As both factors have been associated with the equity cost of capital, the results of this 
study imply that disclosure policy is negatively associated with South African companies' cost of 
equity capital. 
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The hypothesised size effect is statistically highly significant and implies that the level of information 
asymmetry is lower for larger companies, which is likely to be the cause of higher overall information 
availability. This is consistent with international research findings that larger companies experience 
greater information dissemination. 
The statistical1y insignificant findings for the model employing trading volume as proxy for 
information asymmetry suggest that there is no disclosure policy effect. This is consistent with 
international findings and supports criticism ofthe variable as proxy for information asymmetry due to 
the significant degree of non-information influence to which a company's trading volume is exposed. 
Additionally, all sample companies are large which gives rise to the possibility of a sample-specific 
anomaly. A sample with greater diversity of company sizes may possibly render different results. 
In summary, the findings of this study confirm international research and show that, in South Africa, a 
negative relationship between disclosure policy and information asymmetry exists. This may be 
extended to be seen as indicative of a negative relationship between disclosure policy and the equity 
cost of capital. 
5.3 The Research Sfudv - Analyst Behaviour 
Financial analysts perform important capital market roles as information intermediaries, providers and 
monitors of corporate performance. An important source of analysts' knowledge is company provided 
information. International research has found that corporate disclosure policy, which can be 
disaggregated into three separate components, affects analyst behaviour. More specifically, it has been 
shown that positive associations exist between disclosure policy and the number of analysts following 
a company as well as the accuracy of analyst forecasts. Negative associations have been found 
between disclosure policy and forecast dispersion and the volatility of earnings forecasts revisions. 
This implies that, for companies with higher levels of disclosure policy, analysts provide a narrower 
range of forecasts and their forecast revisions are smoother. 
In South Africa, limited research on analysts and no apparent research on the disclosure policy effect 
on their behaviour has been conducted. Consequently, the objective of this study was to determine 
whether a positive disclosure policy effect on the number of analysts and their forecast accuracy and a 
negative effect on the forecast dispersion and revision volatility exist. 
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The same sample companies as discussed in section 5.2 were chosen. Again, the data was tested and 
found unsuitable for OLS regression analysis, which motivated the same rank transformation as 
mentioned in section 5.2. The same methodology, i.e. Rank Regression, was employed to regress each 
of the four individual dependent variables against a measure of disclosure policy and five additional 
explanatory factors. These control variables include proxies for company size, the level of information 
asymmetry surrounding a company's share, the level of the forecasting process' complexity and a 
measure of the unexplained proportion of the forecasting error. This methodology was previously 
applied by Dum and Reeb (2002), Healy et al. (1999), Hope (2003), Lang and Lundholm (1996) and 
Marquardt and Wiedman (1998). 
The same measures of disclosure policy and company size as discussed in section 5.2 were used, 
namely, the E&Y survey's rating of annual reports and market capitalisation respectively. In order to 
control for peer pressure amongst analysts, the number of analysts also served as a control variable in 
the analysis of the disclosure policy effect on analyst behaviour. Research indicates that such peer 
pressure may explain forecast accuracy. Forecasting complexity was approximated by the historic 
standard deviation of companies' return on equity and the historic correlation of return on equity and 
share returns. Lastly, the unexplained proportion of the forecast error was controlled for by including a 
factor of the earnings surprise, which measures the difference between the current and prior year's 
earnings. 
The results found are statistically inconclusive. While there is statistical evidence that companies' 
analyst following is a function of their disclosure policy, no such conclusion could be drawn for the 
remaining three variables: forecast dispersion, forecast accuracy and forecast revision volatility. Clear 
and statistically significant relationships between all dependent variables and size were found in the 
predicted directions. More analysts tend to follow larger companies, analyst forecasts fall into a 
narrower range, their accuracy improves and revisions are smoother for larger companies. This shows 
that the proxies of analyst behaviour were correctly specified. The fact that explicit relationships 
between company size and analyst behaviour could be established but none between the three 
dependent variables and disclosure policy suggests the existence of a model specification problem. 
This study, consistent with international researchers, approximated disclosure policy as rating of the 
annual report. While this approach yields results that are internationally comparable with regard to the 
level of information asymmetry as shown in 5.2, it appears too broad for analyst behaviour. This is 
supported by the statistical inconsistency of this study'S results and an aggregate disclosure policy 
variable used by Lang and Lundholm (1996). Consequently, the results of this study advocate that the 
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chosen proxy for disclosure policy is inappropriate for the field of analyst behaviour. For the purpose 
of assessing the disclosure policy effect on analyst behaviour, it should, therefore, be considered a 
proxy for annual reporting policy only. 
After adopting this approach, this study shows that, in contrast to international findings, the annual 
report is an important determinant of companies' analyst following in South Africa. More specifically, 
the annual report was found to be positively associated with analyst following. Moreover, the annual 
report was not found to influence forecast dispersion, forecast accuracy and the revision volatility in 
South Africa. This suggests that more timely means of company disclosure, such as other published 
information and investor relations, appear to be more important in the latter three forms of analyst 
behaviour. This finding is consistent with international research. 
In summary, the results of this study indicate that the chosen proxy for disclosure policy was not 
sufficiently broad enough to embody the effect of more timely disclosure forms such as investor 
relations and other published documents. As a result, three out of four models were found to exhibit 
specification problems, as evidenced by the low proportion of explained variation (adjusted R2). When 
assessed as a measure of annual reporting only, this study indicates that the annual report is important 
for the number of analysts following South African companies. However, the range of forecasts, 
forecast accuracy and the forecast revision volatility do not appear to be affected by the level of South 
African companies' annual reporting. 
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5.4 Future Research 
The findings discussed above give rise to a number of possible future research projects. Four of these 
are discussed below. 
In the field of information asymmetry, the results for the model of information asymmetry employing 
companies' trading volume as a proxy suggest that the sample of companies may have been 
responsible for the statistically insignificant findings. As a result, this study should be reperformed on 
a sample comprising a greater diversity in terms of company size. This is supported by sample 
selection processes favoured by contemporary researchers such as Hail (2001) and Lang and 
Lundholm (2000) who noted that smaller companies are more likely to use their disclosure policies to 
communicate with the market. 
This study provides tentative evidence as to a disclosure policy effect on companies' cost of equity 
capital in the South African context. A study could be conducted to research the existence of such an 
effect in a more direct and explicit manner than was done by this study. 
With regard to analyst behaviour, the findings of this study suggest that the measure of disclosure 
policy within this study may not be optimaL Consequently, the study should be extended to 
incorporate proxies for both investor relations and other published information. These should be rated 
in a manner compatible with the E& Y survey of Excellence in Reporting and the AIMR assessment of 
corporate disclosure. Additionally, an aggregate measure including the influence of all three forms of 
disclosure could be derived to test South African companies for a disclosure policy effect on analyst 
behaviour in a manner consistent with international research. 
Lastly, as indicated in Table 1 - 3, contemporary researchers have studied various variables and 
alternative proxies that were not addressed within this study. There may thus be an opportunity to 
research the same fields as this study did by employing different proxies and variables. 
96 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
ApPENDICES 
A. Appendix - Sample Companies 2000-2003 Financial Years 
'. 
2000 ". ~lOOf ....•.•••.•........... 2002 . '.2003 . ":"' . 
1 ABSA Group Limited ated Amalaamated ABSA Grouo Limited 
2 Advanced Software African Bank African Bank AECI Limited 
3 AECI Limited Avena Limited Avena Limited Afari Limited 
4 African Bank Alexander Forbes Alexander Forbes African Bank 
5 African Life Assurance AECI Limited AECI Limited African Life Assurance 
6 African Oxvaen Limited African Life Assurance Afari Limited African Oxvaen Limited 
7 Alexander Forbes African Oxvaen Limited African Oxvaen Limited Afrox Healthcare 
8 Allied Technoloaies Analo American Pic Analo American Pic Alexander Forbes 
9 Amalaamated Afrox Healthcare Afrox Healthcare Allan Grav Prooertv 
10 Anolo American AlliegTechnoloQ ies Allied Technologies Allied Technoloaies 
11 Analo American Pic Ana 10 American Anqlo American =amated 
12 Analoaold Ashanti Analoaold Ashanti Analoaold Ashanti nolo American 
13 Analovaallndustries Aspen Pharmacare Asoen Pharmacare Analo American Pic 
14 Aspen Pharmacare ABSA Group Limited ABSA Group Limited Analoaold Ashanti 
15 Avena Limited Analovaallndustries Assore Limited Analovaal Industries 
i 16 Barloworld Limited Barloworld Limited Anglovaallndustries Asoen Pharmacare 
17 BHP Billiton Pic BH P Billiton Pic Barloworld Limited Assore Limited 
18 Bidvest Group Limited Bidvest Group Limited BHP Billiton Pic Avena Limited 
19 BraitSA Capital Alliance Bidvest Grouo Limited Barloworld Limited 
. 20 Datatec Limited Dimension Data Capital Alliance BHP Billiton Pic 
21 Delta Electrical Delta Electrical Dimension Data Bidvest Grouo Limited 
22 Dimension Data Distell Group Limited Delta Electrical Capital Alliance 
23 Discovery Holdinas Discoverv Holdinas Distel! Group Limited Delta Electrical 
24 Edaars Consolidated Durban Roodeooort [)iscovery Holdinas Dimension Data 
25 Firstrand Limited Edaars Consolidated Durban Roodepoort Discovery Holdinas 
26 Foschini Limited Ellerine Holdinas Edaars Consolidated Distell Group Limited 
27 Gold Fields Limited Foschini Limited Foschini Limited Durban Roodeooort 
28 Harmony Gold Minina Firstrand Limited Firstrand Limited Edaars Consolidated 
29 Hiahveld Steel and Gold Fields Limited Gold Fields Limited Ellerine Holdinas 
30 Illovo$uaar Limited Allan Gray Property Allan Grav Prooertv Firstrand Limited 
31 Impala Platinum Harmonv Gold Minino Harmony Gold Minina Foschini Limited 
32 Imperial Holdinas Wovo Suaar Limited Hiahveld Steel and Gold Fields Limited 
33 Investec Limited Impala PI;:ltinum /IIovo Sugar Limited Growthooint Prooerties 
34 JD Group Limited Investec Limited Impala Platinum Harmony Gold Minina 
35 Libertv Grouo Limited Imoerial Holdinas Investec Limited Iliovo Suaar Limited 
I 36 Liberj:y International Pic Johnnic Imoerial Holdinas Imoala Platinum 
37 Massmart Holdinas JD Group Limited Johnnie Imperial Holdinas 
38 Medi-Clinic Corooration Liberty International Pic JDGroup Limited Investec Limited 
39 Metro Cash and Carry Liberty Group Limited Kumba Resources JD Grouo Limited 
40 Metropolitan Life Mutual & Federal Liberty Group Limited Johnnic 
41 Mutual & Federal Medi-Clinic Corooration Mutual & Federal Kumba Resources 
. 42 Nampak Limited Metropolitan Life Medi-Clinic Corooration Libertv GroUD Limited 
i 43 Naspers Limited Massmart Holdinas Massmart Holdings Liberty International Pic 
44 Nedcor Limited Metro Cash and Carry Metro Cash and Carry Massmart Holdinas 
45 New Clicks Holdinas Murrav & Roberts Murray & Roberts Medi-Clinic Corooration 
46 Northam Platinum New Clicks Holdinas Mvelaphanda Metro Cash and Carf\L 
47 Old Mutual pic Nedcor Limited New Clicks Holdings MTN Group Limited 
48 Pick n Pay Stores Northam Platinum Nedcor Limited Murrav & Roberts 
49 Rebserye Holdinas Nampak Limited Northam Platinum Mutual & Federal 
50 Remara Limited Nasoers Limited Namoak Limited Namoak Limited 
51 Reunert Limited Old Mutual pic Naspers Limited Naspers Limited 
52 Richemont Securities Pick n Pay Stores Network Healthcare Nedcor Limited 
53 RMB Holdinas Limited Rebserye Holdinas Oceana GrouP Limited Network He~lthcare 
54 Saambou Holdinas Richemont Securities Old MutLJal pic New Clicks Holdings 
55 SABlVliller Pic ~mqro Limited Palabora Minina Northam Platinum 
56 Sage Group Limited unert Limited Pick n Pay Stores Oceana Group Limited 
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I 57 Sanlam Limited RMB Holdinas Limited Richemont Securities Old Mutual olc 
I 58 Santam Limited SABMiller Pic Remoro Limited Palabora MininQ 
I 59 Saooi Limited South African Eaale Reunert Limited Pick n Pav Stores 
160 Sasol Limited Sa!;!!;!i Limited RMB Holdinas Limited Remaro Limited 
I 61 Shoorite Holdinas Steinhoff International SABMilIer Pic Reunert Limited 
I 62 Standard Bank Group Shoprite Holdinas Sgmoi Limited Richemont Securities 
I 63 Steinhoff International San lam Limited Standard Bank Grouo RMB Holdinas Limited 
I 64 Super Group Limited Santam Limited Steinhoff International SABMilier Pic 
I 65 TonQaat-Hulett GrouP Sasol Limited Shoorite Holdinas San lam Limited 
I 66 Truworths International Super Group Limited San lam Limited Santam Limited 
I 67 Unitrans Limited Tonaaat-Hulett GrouP San tam Limited Sapoi Limited 
I 68 Western Areas Limited Truworths International Sasol Limited Sasol Limited I 
69 Woolworths HoldinQs Unitrans Limited Super Groun Limited Shoorite Holdinas 
I 70 Venfin Limited Tonaaat-Hulett GrouP Standard Bank Group 
71 Western Areas Limited Tourism Investment Steinhoff International i 
l 72 Woolworths Holdinas Truworths International Suner GrouP Limited 
73 Trans Hex Group Svcom Propert'{ Fund 
I 74 Unitrans Limited Tonaaat-Hulett Group 
I 75 Venfin Limited Trans Hex GrouP 
76 Western Areas Limited Trencor Limited 
77 Woolworths Holdinas Truworths International 
78 United Service 
l 79 Unitrans Limited 
80 Venfin Limited 
I 81 Western Areas Limited 
I 82 Woolworths Holdings 
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B. Test for Normality - Dependent Variables 
«.Y ariable ... ·· ... c • i;i. ! .. ~. ,Year If?~~; Shapiro-Wilk ." ···i. Lilliefors 
•••••••••••••••• 
i Bid-Ask Spread 2001 p<.Ol p<.Ol 
2002 p<.Ol p<.Ol 
2003 p<.Ol p<.Ol 
2004 p<.Ol p<.Ol 
• Trading Volume 2001 p<.Ol p<.OI 
2002 p<.01 p<.01 
2003 p<.Ol p<.Ol 
2004 p<.Ol p<.Ol 
• Number of Analysts 2001 p<.Ol p<.Ol 
.. 
2002 p<.Ol p<.Ol 
2003 p<.05 p<.20 
2004 p<.05 p<.20 
Forecast Dispersion 2001 p<.Ol p<.OI 
2002 p<.Ol p<.Ol 
2003 p<.OI p<.OI 
2004 p<.OI p<.OI 
Forecast Accuracy 2001 p<.Ol p<.Ol 
2002 p<.Ol p<.01 
H OO3 p<.Ol p<.Ol 004 p<.Ol p<.Ol 
Revision Volatility 2001 p<.Ol p<.Ol 
2002 p<.Ol p<.01 
2003 p<.Ol p<.Ol 
2004 p<.Ol p<.Ol 
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c. Test of OLS regression assumptions - #Anlvst 2003 - 2004 
C.I Test of Normality: Residual #Anlyst 2003 
Histogram(Predicted & Residual Values (2003)) Residual SW-W = 0.929622753, P :;;; 0.0005 
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CIII Test of Normality: Residual #Anlvst 2004 
Histogram (Predicted & Residual Values (2004)~esidual: sw-w = 0.947005482, P = 0.003~ 
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C.IV Test of Constant Variance: #Anlvst 2004 
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D. Descriptive Statistics 2002 - 2004 
D. I Descriptive Statistics 2002 
~Anlyst ... ~::_nl ~*~,;,:,f ··Median Minimnm Maximum Std:Dev" 8.875 1.3636 11.9 2.91 
· ForDisp Absolute 69 1= 0.01 0.007 0.0006 0.1 0.01 
ForAcc Percentage 67 -0.04 -0.012 -0.4440 0.0 0.07 
Rev Vol Pen::entage 66 0.00 0.000 0.0000 0.0 0.00 
Size R'OOO 69 13737.00 3851.510 798.5300 144958.8 23703.74 i 
! Spread Percentage 7] 0.02 0.012 0.0030 0.1 0.02 
I Vol Percentage 71 0.00 0.001 0.0000 0.0 0.00 
Ret Vol Absolute 71 0.10 0.094 0.0433 0.2 0.04 
!HSDROE Absolute 72 0.47 0.084 0.0045 17.2 2.06 
R-ECorr Absolute 59 0.20 0.205 -0.6257 1.0 0.42 
EarnSurp Percentage I 72 -0.00 0.000 -0.0024 0.0 0.00 
Score Percentage 72 0.47 0.479 0.2215 0.8 0.12 
D.II Descriptive Statistics 2003 
. .. Unit Measure ValldN Meai' Median Minimum MaxiDlum Std.;De'V . 
#Anlyst Absolute 75 7.49 7.833 1.0000 12.9 2.99 
ForDisp Absolute 73 0.01 0.007 0.0010 0.1 0.01 
ForAcc Percentage 73 -0.06 -0.016 -1.9179 0.0 0.24 
Rev Vol Percentage 73 0.00 0.000 0.0000 0.0 0.00 
Size R'OOO 75 15515.89 3825.110 245.1700 196492.7 29743.99 
I Spread Percentage 77 0.02 0.0]2 0.0030 0.1 0.02 
Vol Percentage 77 0.00 0.001 0.0001 0.0 0.00 
I RetVol Absolute 77 0.09 0.087 0.0370 0.2 0.04 
I HSDROE Absolute 77 0.94 0.094 0.0045 32.4 4.18 
• R-ECorr Absolute 69 0.11 0.136 -1.0000 1.0 0.47 
! EarnSurp Percentage 77 0.00 0.000 -0.0150 0.0 0.00 
Score Percentage 77 0.47 0.454 0.1584 0.7 0.12 
D. III Descriptive Statistics 2004 
. Unit Measure ValidN' , i.i1\fean Median Minimum Maxinlum SId. Dev. 
#Anlyst Absolute 80 6.34 6.417 1.000 11.7 2.99 
I ForDisp I Absolute 78 0.01 0.008 0.001 0.0 0.01 
ForAcc Percentage 80 -0.05 -0.025 -0.688 0.0 0.10 
Rev Vol Percentage 79 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.0 0.00 
·ze R'OOO 82 17960.10 4214.300 1089.360 271475.9 37670.72 
Spread Percentage 82 0.02 0.015 ! 0.005 0.2 0.02 
Vol Percentage 82 0.00 0.001 0.000 0.0 0.00 
Ret Vol Absolute 82 0.09 0.076 0.034 0.3 0.04 
HSDROE Absolute 82 0.99 0.094 0.005 32.4 4.12 
! R-ECorr Absolute 78 0.14 0.189 -1.000 1.0 0.48 
· EarnSurp ~ercentage 82 -0.00 0.000 -0.005 0.0 0.00 
Score Percentage 82 0.43 0.426 0.079 0.7 0.]4 
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